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Overweight Defense stocks have been range-bound in the last week as geopolitical maneuvering has seen probabilities of conflict on the Korean peninsula swinging wildly back and forth. Using this conflict to value defense equities seems fraught with forecast risk and we would argue that focusing on domestic rearmament is a better use of investors' time. In last month's data release, Department of Defense outlays showed the longest streak of increases this decade, pointing to a continued acceleration in defense spending (second panel). This is mirrored by surging government investment in defense, now at its highest level in 5 years (third panel). The Trump administration's commitment to rearmament has now made it into the federal budget; the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates defense outlays will approximate wartime levels in 2019 (bottom panel). Net, we expect earnings visibility will peak through the fog of war and be the ultimate driver of stock market returns; stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the BCA Defense index are: LMT, GD, RTN, NOC, LLL.
Dear Client, I will be visiting clients next week. Instead of our Weekly Report, we will be sending you a Special Report written by my colleagues Matt Gertken and Ray Park. The report addresses the North Korean situation and argues that a positive, if not perfect, diplomatic solution will result from U.S.-North Korean negotiations. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights The U.S. can withstand further rate hikes. Neither economic nor financial imbalances are especially elevated, while fiscal stimulus will offset much of the sting from tighter monetary policy. Unfortunately, America's resilience to higher rates does not extend to the rest of the world. A stronger dollar is undermining emerging markets, which are already under pressure from slower Chinese growth and the looming prospect of trade wars. The crisis in Italy will further restrain the ECB from withdrawing monetary support. Investors focused on capital preservation should remain underweight Italian bonds. More speculatively-minded investors could consider opening a long position in BTPs versus bunds, but not before the Italian 10-year yield has reached 4%. EUR/USD came within a whisker of our 1.15 target this week. We will book profits on our long DXY trade recommendation if the dollar index reaches 96. A defensive posture is appropriate for now, but risk assets should recover later this year as the global economy finds its footing. This could set the scene for a blow-off rally in stocks. Feature Gauging The Pain Threshold From Higher Rates Chart 1Market Expectations Slightly Below Fed Dots After the recent turbulence, the market is pricing in 100 basis points of Fed rate hikes between now and the end of 2020 (Chart 1). Such a pace of rate hikes would be quite slow by historic standards. In past tightening cycles, the Fed would typically raise rates by about 50 basis points per quarter. Investors expect the real fed funds rate to peak at around 1%, well below the historic average of 3%-to-5%. Underlying these expectations is the presumption that the neutral rate of interest - the rate consistent with full employment and stable inflation - is quite low, and that the Fed will not have to raise rates much above neutral to cool the economy. According to the April FOMC minutes, "a few" participants thought that the fed funds rate was already close to its equilibrium level. There are many reasons to think that R-star has fallen over time, but in practice, the margin of error around estimates of the neutral rate is huge. Thus, rather than getting bogged down over technical issues, investors would be well served by taking a more practical approach and asking what they should be on the lookout for to determine whether interest rates have moved into restrictive territory. The State Of The U.S. Housing Market Housing has historically been the most important interest rate-sensitive sector, so much so that Ed Leamer entitled his 2007 Jackson Hole symposium paper "Housing Is The Business Cycle."1 Given the recent runup in mortgage yields, it is not too surprising that the latest data on U.S. housing has been on the weak side (Chart 2). Mortgage applications for purchase have come off their highs. Housing starts, building permits, and new and existing home sales all declined in April. Homebuilder sentiment improved a tad, but this was due to an increase in the current sales component; future sales expectations were flat on the month. The share of respondents who indicated that now was a good time to buy a home in the latest University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment survey declined to 69% in May, continuing its slide from a peak of 83% in December 2014. Still, we would not fret too much about the state of the U.S. housing market (Chart 3). Construction activity has been slow to increase this cycle, which has pushed vacancies to ultra-low levels. Home prices have been rising briskly, but are still 13% below their 2006 peak once adjusted for inflation. On both a price-to-rent and price-to-income basis, home prices do not appear overly stretched. Mortgage servicing costs, expressed as a share of disposable income, are near all-time lows. The homeownership rate has also been trending higher, thanks to faster household formation and an improving labor market. Chart 2U.S. Housing: Higher Mortgage##br## Rates Are A Headwind... Chart 3...But Don't##br## Fret Yet Household Debt Is Not Yet At Worrying Levels Lenders also remain circumspect (Chart 4). Mortgage debt has barely grown as a share of disposable income throughout the recovery, and is still 31 percentage points below 2007 levels. The average FICO score for new mortgages stands at a healthy 761, well above pre-recession standards. The Urban Institute Housing Credit Availability Index, which measures the percentage of home purchase loans that are likely to default over the next 90 days, is nowhere close to dangerous levels. This is particularly the case for private-label mortgages, whose default risk has hovered at just over 2% during the past few years, down from a peak of 22% in 2006. A dwindling share of loan originations since the financial crisis has involved adjustable rate mortgages (Chart 5). This has made the housing market more resilient to Fed rate hikes. Other parts of the household credit arena look more menacing, but not so much that they threaten to short-circuit the economy. Banks have been tightening lending standards on auto loans since Q2 of 2016 and credit card loans since the second quarter of last year. This should help moderate the increase in default rates that has been observed in those categories (Chart 6). Chart 4Mortgage Debt Is Not ##br##A Cause For Concern Chart 5Housing Market: More Resilient To ##br##Rate Hikes Than It Used To Be Chart 6Lenders Are More ##br##Circumspect These Days Student debt has continued to trend higher, but the vast majority of these loans is backstopped by the government. While the Treasury's own finances are on an unsustainable trajectory, this is more of a long-term concern than a short-term problem. If anything, fiscal stimulus over the next two years will allow the Fed to raise rates more than it could otherwise without endangering the economy. Corporate Borrowing: High But Not Extreme Like a river, market liquidity tends to flow along the path of least resistance, rather than towards those who happen to be the most thirsty. While the household sector was piling on debt during the 2001-2007 boom, the U.S. corporate sector was still recovering from the hangover produced by the capex boom in the late 1990s. A decade later, corporate balance sheets were in good shape. Spurred on by ultra-low interest rates, corporate debt levels began to rise. Today, the ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP is near a record high. Valuations for corporate assets have reached lofty levels. In inflation-adjusted terms, commercial real estate prices are 4% above their pre-recession peak (Chart 7). U.S. equities also trade at a historically elevated multiple to earnings, sales, and book value (Chart 8). There are bright spots, however (Chart 9). Thanks to lofty corporate profits, the ratio of corporate debt-to-EBITDA is in the middle of its post-1990 range based on national accounts data. Interest payments-to-EBIT are near historic lows. Corporate bonds now represent 60% of total corporate liabilities. Bonds tend to have much longer maturities than bank loans, which provides a buffer against default risk. Although the picture is not as benign if one performs a bottom-up analysis of publicly-listed companies, the overall message is that the U.S. corporate sector can handle higher rates. Corporate stresses will eventually rise, but it will likely take a recession for this to happen, which we don't expect until 2020. Chart 7Commercial Real Estate Prices: ##br##Above Pre-Recession Levels Chart 8U.S. Equities##br## Are Overvalued Chart 9Corporate Debt Is High,##br## But So Are Profits Cyclical Spending Still Subdued The discussion above suggests that U.S. interest rate-sensitive sectors can withstand further rate hikes. This conclusion is buttressed by the observation that the cyclical sectors of the economy - the ones that tend to weaken the most during recessions - have yet to reach levels that make them vulnerable to a sharp retrenchment. Chart 10 shows that the sum of business capital spending, residential and commercial construction, and consumer discretionary goods purchases is still well below levels that have preceded past recessions. Along the same lines, the private sector financial balance - the difference between what the private sector earns and what it spends - is currently in surplus to the tune of 2.2% of GDP. This compares to deficits of 5.4% of GDP in 2000 and 3.8% of GDP in 2006 (Chart 11). Further monetary tightening, to the extent that it prevents any brewing imbalances in the real economy and financial markets from worsening, may be just what the doctor ordered. Chart 10Cyclical Spending Still Below Levels##br## Preceding Past Recessions Chart 11U.S. Private Sector Financial##br## Balance Is Healthy The Sneeze Felt Around The World The U.S. is not an island unto itself. Even if a bit outdated, the old adage which says that when the U.S. sneezes the rest of the world catches a cold, still rings true. As such, focusing on the neutral rate only as it pertains to the U.S. is a bit too parochial. There may be a lower "shadow" neutral rate which, if breached, causes pain outside the U.S. before it causes pain in the U.S. itself. Emerging markets are particularly sensitive to changes in U.S. financial conditions. About 80% of EM foreign-currency debt is denominated in dollars. A stronger dollar and higher U.S. interest rates make it more difficult for EM borrowers to service their debts. While EM foreign-currency debt has declined as a share of total debt outstanding, this is only because the past decade has seen a boom in local debt issuance (Chart 12). As a share of GDP, exports, and international reserves, U.S. dollar debt is at levels not seen in over 15 years (Chart 13). Most emerging markets entered 2018 with strong growth momentum. Recent tracking estimates point to some deceleration in GDP growth, but nothing too alarming (Chart 14). That could begin to change. EM financial conditions have started to tighten, which is likely to weigh on activity. BCA's Emerging Market and Geopolitical Strategy teams have flagged the prospect of policy-inducing tightening in China. Trade tensions also seem to be escalating again following President Trump's decision this week to curb Chinese investment in the U.S., impose a 25% tariff on $50 billion of Chinese imports, and slap tariffs on foreign steel. All this could put an additional dent in global growth. While this publication does not expect a full-blown EM crisis, a period of EM underperformance over the next few months is likely. Chart 12EM Borrowers Like Local Credit, ##br##But Don't Dislike Foreign-Currency Debt Chart 13EM Dollar##br## Debt Is High Chart 14EM Growth Decelerating,##br## But Not Dramatically... Yet Italy: If You Are Gonna Do The Time, You Might As Well Do The Crime Even if emerging markets avoid another major crisis, one can always count on Europe to try to fill the void. The Italian 10-year bond yield is up over 100 basis points since the middle of April. Assuming a fiscal multiplier of one, a standard Taylor Rule equation says that Italy would need 2% of GDP in fiscal stimulus per year to offset the tightening in financial conditions brought upon by the recent increase in borrowing costs.2 That is 20% of GDP in stimulus over the next decade to pay for a fiscal package that has yet to be implemented by a government that does not yet (and may never) exist. At this point, investors are basically punishing Italy for a crime – defaulting and possibly jettisoning the euro – it has yet to commit. If you are going to get reprimanded for something you have not done, you have more incentive to do it. The market realizes this, which is why it is locked in a vicious circle where rising yields make default more likely, leading to even higher yields (Chart 15). The fact that GDP per capita in Italy is no higher now than when the country adopted the euro in 1999, and Italian public support for euro area membership is lower than elsewhere, has only added fuel to investor concerns (Chart 16). Chart 15When A Lender Of Last Resort Is Absent, Multiple Equilibria Are Possible Chart 16Italy: Neither Divine Nor A Comedy As we go to press, rumours are swirling that the Five Star Movement and Lega may be able to form a government after agreeing to appoint a less euroskeptic finance minister than the one the Italian President previously rejected. Regardless of whether this happens, investors are likely to remain on edge. Support for Lega has risen by seven percent since voters went to the polls in March. Populism is here to stay. All this suggests that the brewing crisis in Italy will not blow over easily. Investors focused on capital preservation should remain underweight Italian bonds. More speculatively-minded investors should consider opening a long position in BTPs versus bunds, but not before the Italian 10-year yield reaches 4%. At that point, the risk-reward trade-off from owning Italian debt would be too good to ignore. Until the Italian bond market reaches a capitulation point, the euro will remain under pressure. The Italian sovereign debt market is the biggest in Europe and the fourth largest in the world after the U.S., Japan, and China. If foreign investors continue to shun Italian debt, that will reduce capital inflows into the euro area. This means less demand for the common currency. Investment Conclusions The softening of global growth this year, along with tensions in emerging markets and Italy, have lit a fire under the dollar. Our long DXY trade is up 10.7% inclusive of carry. We continue to think that the path of least resistance for the dollar is up, but we will be looking to book gains on our trade recommendation once the dollar index reaches 96. That's roughly 2% above current levels. Slower global growth is bad news for cyclical equities. European and Japanese equities have a greater tilt towards cyclical sectors, so it is likely that their stock markets will underperform the U.S. over the next few months. This is particularly the case for Europe, where banks have come under pressure due to slower domestic growth, rising bond yields in Italy and Spain, and heightened exposure to emerging markets. For now, our MacroQuant model, which is designed to capture short-term movements in the stock market, is recommending a somewhat below-benchmark allocation to equities. Looking further out, our 12-month cyclical view on stocks remains modestly constructive, reflecting our expectation that the next major recession in developed markets is still two years away. Keep in mind that even the EM crisis in the 1990s did not plunge the U.S. into recession. On the contrary, the crisis restrained the Fed from raising rates too quickly. The resulting dose of liquidity led to a massive blow-off rally in equities, which took the S&P 500 up 68% between October 1998 and March 2000. European stocks did even better during that period, outperforming their U.S. peers by 40% in local-currency terms. We may be heading for a similar sequence of events. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Edward E. Leamer, "Housing Is The Business Cycle," Proceedings, Economic Policy Symposium, Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, (2007). 2 The original Taylor Rule introduced by John Taylor in 1992 assigns a coefficient of 0.5 on the output gap. Thus, a one hundred basis-point rise in interest rates would be necessary to offset a 2% of GDP increase in output. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Neutral Relative share price gains for the S&P managed health care index are nearly exhausted. In Tuesday's Weekly Report, we acted on our late-March downgrade alert and took profits of 28% versus the S&P 500 since inception. At the margin, macro drivers have turned from a tailwind to a mild headwind. If relative health care spending has troughed for the cycle, then there are high odds that the decade long relative bull market has run its course and a major top is in place (top panel). Industry revenue growth is fraying around the edges. The second panel shows that the hiring plans subcomponent of the NFIB survey of small business owners has sunk recently. The implication is that enrollment may also be nearing a peak. Finally, the recent industry M&A frenzy is ebbing, signaling that the M&A premia may soon come out of relative valuations, which are already trading one standard deviation above the historical mean (bottom panel). Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P managed health care index to neutral. Please see our Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5MANH - UNH, AET, ANTM, CI, HUM, CNC.
Highlights The 10-year Italian BTP yield at 4% yield marks a 'line in the sand' at which the current drama could escalate into something considerably worse. The global 6-month credit impulse is now indisputably in a mini-downswing phase. Stay underweight in the classically cyclical sectors: banks, basic materials and industrials. Prefer France's CAC over Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX. The equity market's range-bound pattern can continue, as long as the line in the sand isn't breached. It is a good time to own a small portfolio of high-quality 30-year government bonds. It was a spectacular week for our fractal trades with four positions hitting their profit targets: long Poland/short Italy; short energy/long basic materials; short Spanish Bonos/long German bunds; and long AUD/NOK. Feature Italian politics have blindsided almost everybody, us included. Few anticipated that the unlikely bedfellows 5S and Lega would try and form a 'government of change'. In March we wrote: "The Italian election result is not an investment game changer. The one exception would be if 5S and Lega joined forces to govern, as it could throw EU integration into reverse. But the likelihood of this unholy alliance seems very low." Even fewer anticipated that Italy's President, Sergio Mattarella, would then scupper this government of change by vetoing the proposed Finance Minister. This has cast a new pall of uncertainty over Italian politics and Italian public support for EU rules and institutions. The 10-Year BTP Yield At 4% Marks A 'Line In The Sand' The market's response has been to fear the worst: shoot first, ask questions later. The danger is that this sets off a negative feedback loop. Higher bond yields weaken Italy's still-fragile banks; which threatens Italy's economic recovery; ahead of a possible new election, this increases the support for parties and policies that push back against EU rules; which further lifts bond yields; and then in a vicious circle until the fear of the worst becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy... Chart of the WeekItalian Banks' Solvency Would Be In Question If The 10-Year BTP Yield Breached 4% The Italian BTP versus German bund yield spread is effectively a fear gauge for Italy's future in the euro (Chart I-2). As these fears increase, and Italian bond prices decline, it erodes the value of Italian banks' €350 billion portfolio of BTPs and weakens the banks' balance sheets. Chart I-2The BTP-Bund Yield Spread Is A Fear ##br## Gauge For Italy's Future In The Euro As a rule of thumb, investors start to get nervous about a bank's solvency when equity capital no longer covers net non-performing loans (NPLs). On this rule, the largest Italian banks now have €165 billion of equity capital against €130 billion of net NPLs, implying excess capital of €35 billion (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Italian Banks' Equity Capital Exceeds Net NPLs By Euro 35 Bn It follows that there would be fresh doubts about Italian banks' mark-to-market solvency if their bond valuations sustained a drop of just a tenth from the recent peak. We estimate this equates to the 10-year BTP yield breaching and remaining above 4%.1 Hence, the 10-year BTP yield at 4% marks a 'line in the sand' at which the current drama could escalate into something considerably worse (Chart of the Week). To short-circuit the negative feedback loop, the financial markets would need to sense a discernible shift in Italian support for its populist parties; or an explicit de-escalation in the populist pushback against the EU. The question is: could this happen quickly enough? Global Growth Is In A Mini-Downswing The market's concerns about Italy come at a time when global growth has in any case been losing momentum. This is one development that did not blindside us, and has unfolded exactly as predicted. In January we wrote: "Global growth experiences remarkably consistent - and therefore predictable - 'mini-cycles', with half-cycle lengths averaging 8 months. As the current mini-upswing started in May 2017 we can infer that it is likely to end at some point in early 2018. So one surprise could be that global growth will lose steam in the first half of 2018 rather than in the second half - contrary to what the consensus is expecting." The theory underlying these mini-cycles is an economic model called the Cobweb Theorem.2 When bond yields rise, interest rate sensitive sectors in the economy feel a headwind, but with a delay. Similarly, when bond yields decline, interest rate sensitive sectors feel a tailwind, but again with a delay. The delay occurs because credit demand leads credit supply by several months (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Turning Points In The Bond Yield Lead Turning Points In The Credit Impulse As credit demand leads credit supply, the turning point in the price of credit (the bond yield) always leads the quantity of credit supplied (the credit impulse). The result is a perpetual mini-cycle oscillation in both economic variables. And because the quantity of credit supplied is a marginal driver of economic activity, this also creates mini-cycles in economic activity. These mini-cycles are remarkably regular with half-cycle lengths averaging around eight months, and the regularity creates predictability. Moreover, as most investors are unaware of these cycles, the next turning point is not discounted in financial market prices - providing a compelling investment opportunity for those who do recognise the predictability. The global 6-month credit impulse is now indisputably in a mini-downswing phase, and exactly as predicted in January, the majority of economically sensitive sectors have underperformed. The glaring anomaly is oil, whose supply-side dynamics have dominated price action (Chart I-5). Given oil's major impact on headline inflation, inflation expectations, and on central bank reaction functions, the global bond yield has also disconnected from the mini-cycle - until now. Chart I-5Oil Is The Glaring Anomaly Mini-downswings last six to eight months and the usual release valve is a decline in bond yields. So one concern is that the apparent disconnect between decelerating global activity and slow-to-react bond yields could extend the current mini-downswing phase beyond the summer. How To Invest Right Now From an equity market perspective, the relative performance of the classically cyclical sectors - banks, basic materials and industrials - very closely tracks the phases of the global credit impulse mini-cycle (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). For example, in all five of the last five mini-downswings, banks have underperformed healthcare, and we are seeing exactly the same in the current mini-cycle. Chart I-6In A Mini-Downswing##br## Banks Underperform Chart I-7In A Mini-Downswing ##br##Basic Materials Underperform For the next few months at least, it is appropriate to stick with underweights in the classically cyclical sectors: banks, basic materials and industrials. This strategy has worked extremely well since we initiated it at the start of the year, and it should continue to do so. Sector strategy necessarily impacts stock market allocation. Our core philosophy of investment reductionism teaches us that for most stock markets, the sector (and dominant company) skews swamp any effect that comes from the domestic economy. The defining skew for Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX is their large overweighting to banks (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). Irrespective of the political uncertainties, our sector allocation establishes our near-term caution on these two markets. Prefer France's CAC over Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX. Chart I-8Italy's MIB = Long Banks Chart I-9Spain's IBEX = Long Banks For bonds, the implication is that yields can move only slightly higher before stronger headwinds to risk-assets and/or the global economy provide a natural cap and a tradeable reversal in yields. Hence, it is a good time to own a portfolio of high-quality 30-year government bonds. Regarding currencies, the recent developments in Italy have hurt our 50:50 combined long position in EUR/USD and SEK/USD; but this has been countered by gains in our short position in EUR/JPY. We have no tactical conviction on any of these crosses, but we will maintain this medium term currency portfolio unless the Italian 10-year BTP yield breaches the 4% line in the sand. Finally, the hardest call to make is on the direction of equity market. This is because a mini-downswing in global growth creates a headwind to earnings expectations; conversely, if bond yields are capped, this will provide some support to equity market valuations. On balance, this suggests that the year-to-date pattern of a range-bound equity market is set to continue. The caveat is that if Italy's line in the sand is breached, it would warrant a substantial de-risking. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Assuming that the average maturity of Italian banks' BTPs is around 5 years. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles' published on January 11 2018 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* It was a spectacular week for our fractal trades with four positions hitting their profit targets: long Poland/short Italy; short energy/long basic materials; short Spanish Bonos/long German bunds; and long AUD/NOK. This week, we note that the 65-day fractal dimension of the Polish zloty / U.S. dollar (or inverse) is approaching its lower limit. Go long PLN/USD with a profit target of 3.5% and symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Bank Credit Analyst As interest rates rise, investors are looking for the leveraged pressure points in the global economy to identify the sectors most likely to show strain. We previously identified the U.S. corporate bond market as a definite candidate. This month we look at European corporates. European corporations are still well behind the U.S. in the leveraging cycle. Relative trends in corporate financial health have generally favored European credit quality relative to U.S. issuers. Below the surface, balance sheet repair in the Eurozone has been concentrated in domestic issuers; financial trends among foreign issuers have resembled those in the U.S. market. Foreign issuers are much more vulnerable to higher interest rates and an economic downturn. Interest- and debt-coverage ratios are likely to fall to levels that will spark a raft of downgrades for foreign firms issuing into the Eurozone market, in the event that interest rates rise and a recession follows. Investors should concentrate their European corporate bond portfolios in domestic securities. That said, trends in financial health are unlikely to be the key driver of corporate bond relative returns this year. More important will be the end of the ECB's asset purchase program. We recommend an underweight position in Eurozone IG and HY relative to Eurozone government bonds, and relative to U.S. corporates. Risk assets remain on a collision course with monetary policy, which is the main reason why the "return of vol" is a key theme in the BCA 2018 Outlook. In the U.S., rising inflation is expected to limit the FOMC's ability to cushion soft patches in the economic data or negative shocks from abroad. We expect that ECB tapering will add to market stress, especially now that Eurozone breakup risks are again a concern. We also believe that geopolitics will remain a major source of uncertainty and volatility. All this comes at a time when corporate bond spreads offer only a thin buffer against bad news. On a positive note, we remain upbeat on the earnings outlook in the major countries. The U.S. recession that we foresaw in 2019 has been delayed into 2020 by fiscal stimulus. The longer runway for earnings to grow keeps us nervously overweight corporate bonds, at least in the U.S. That said, corporates are no more than a carry trade now that the lows in spreads are in place for the cycle. We are keeping a close eye on a number of indicators that will help us to time the next downgrade to our global corporate bond allocation. Profitability is just one, albeit important, aspect of the financial backdrop. What about the broader trend in financial health? Does the trend justify wider spreads even if the economy and profits hold up over the next year? We reviewed U.S. corporate financial health in the March 2018 monthly Bank Credit Analyst, using our bottom-up sample of companies. We also stress-tested these companies for higher interest rates and a medium-sized recession. We concluded that the U.S. corporate sector's heavy accumulation of debt in this expansion will result in rampant downgrade activity during the next economic downturn. As interest rates rise, investors are looking for the leveraged pressure points in the global economy to identify the sectors most likely to show strain. The U.S. corporate bond market is a definite candidate. This month we extend the analysis to the European corporate sector. The European Corporate Health Monitor The bottom-up version of the Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) is a complement to our top-down CHM, which uses macro data from the ECB to construct an index of six financial ratios for the non-financial corporate sector. While useful as an indicator of the overall trend in corporate financial health, it does not shed light on underlying trends across credit quality, countries and sectors. It also fails to distinguish between domestic versus foreign issuers in the Eurozone market. A number of features of the European market limit the bottom-up analysis to some extent relative to what we are able to do for the U.S.: the Eurozone market is significantly smaller and company data typically do not have as much history; foreign issuers comprise almost 50% of the market, a much higher percentage than in the U.S.; and the Financial sector features more prominently in the Eurozone index, but we exclude it because our CHM methodology does not lend itself well to this sector. We analyzed only domestic issuers in our study of U.S. corporate health. However, we decided to include foreign issuers in our Eurozone analysis in order to maximize the sample size. Moreover, it is appropriate for some bond investors to consider the whole picture, given that important benchmarks such as Barclay's corporate indexes include both foreign and domestic issuers. The relative composition of domestic versus foreign, investment-grade versus high-yield, and industrial sectors in our sample are comparable with the weights used in the Barclay's index. The CHM is calculated using the median value for each of six financial ratios (Table II-1). We then standardize1 the median values for the six ratios and aggregate them into a composite index using a simple average. The result is an index that fluctuates between +/- 2 standard deviations. A rising index indicates deteriorating health, while a downtrend signals improving health. We defined it this way in order to facilitate comparison with trends in corporate spreads. Table II-1Definitions Of Ratios That Go Into The CHMs One has to be careful in interpreting our Eurozone Monitor. The bottom-up version only dates back to 2005. Thus, while both the level and change in the U.S. CHM provide important information regarding balance sheet health, for the Eurozone Monitor we focus more on the change. Whether it is a little above or below the zero line is less important than the trend. Top-Down Versus Bottom-Up Chart II-1 compares the top-down and bottom-up Eurozone CHMs for the entire non-financial corporate sector.2 The levels are different, although the broad trends are similar. Key differences that help to explain the divergence include the following: the top-down CHM defines leverage to be total debt as a percent of the market value of equity, while our bottom-up CHM defines it to be total debt as a percent of the book value of the company. The second panel of Chart II-1 highlights that the two measures of leverage have diverged significantly since 2012; the top-down CHM defines profit margins as total cash flow as a percent of sales. For data-availability reasons, our bottom-up version uses operating income/total sales; and most importantly, the top-down CHM uses ECB data, which includes only companies that are domiciled in the Eurozone. Thus, it excludes foreign issuers that make up a large part of our company sample and the Barclay's index. When we recalculate the bottom-up CHM using only domestic investment-grade issuers, the result is much closer to the top-down version (Chart II-2). Both CHMs have been in 'improving health' territory since the end of the Great Financial Crisis. The erosion in the profitability components during this period was offset by declining leverage, rising liquidity and improving interest coverage for domestic issuers. Chart II-1Top-Down Vs. Bottom-Up Chart II-2Top-Down Vs. Domestic Bottom-Up It has been a different story for foreign IG issuers (Chart II-3). These firms have historically enjoyed a higher return on capital, operating margins, interest coverage, debt coverage and liquidity. Nonetheless, heavy debt accumulation has undermined their interest- and debt-coverage ratios in absolute terms and relative to their domestic peers until very recently. In other words, while domestic issuers have made an effort to clean up their balance sheets since the Great Recession, financial trends among foreign issuers look more like the trends observed in the U.S. No doubt, this is in part due to U.S. companies issuing Euro-denominated debt, but there are many other foreign issuers in our sample as well. Some analysts prefer total debt/total assets to the leverage measure we use in constructing our CHMs. However, the picture is much the same; leverage among IG domestic and foreign firms has diverged dramatically since 2010 (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Bottom-Up: Domestic Vs. Foreign IG Chart II-4Diverging Leverage Trends Over the past year or so there has been some reversal in the post-Lehman trends; domestic health has stabilized, while that of foreign issuers has improved. Leverage among foreign companies has leveled off, while margins and the liquidity ratio have bounced. The results for high-yield (HY) issuers must be taken with a grain of salt because of the small sample size. Chart II-5 highlights that the HY CHM is improving for both domestic and foreign issuers. Impressively, leverage is declining for both the domestic and foreign components. The return on capital, interest coverage, and debt coverage have also improved, although only for foreign issuers. Chart II-5Bottom-Up: Domestic Vs. Foreign HY Corporate Sensitivity The bottom line is that, while there have been some relative shifts below the surface, the European corporate sector's finances are generally in good shape in absolute terms and relative to the U.S. This is particularly the case for domestic issuers that have yet to catch the equity buyback bug. However, less accommodative monetary policy and rising borrowing rates have focused investor attention on corporate sector vulnerability. Downgrade risk will mushroom if corporate borrowing rates continue rising and, especially, if the economy contracts. If there is a recession in Europe in the next few years it will likely be as a result of a downturn in the U.S. We expect a traditional end to the U.S. business cycle; the Fed overdoes the rate hike cycle, sending the economy into a tailspin. The U.S. downturn would spill over to the rest of the world and could drag the Eurozone into a mild contraction. We estimated the change in the interest coverage ratio for the companies in our bottom-up European sample for a 100 basis-point rise in interest rates across the corporate curve, taking into consideration the maturity distribution of the debt (i.e. the coupons reset only for the bonds, notes and loans that mature in the next three years). We make the simplifying assumptions that all debt and loans maturing in the next three years are rolled over, but that companies do not take on net new obligations. We also assume that EBIT is unchanged in order to isolate the impact of higher interest rates. The 'x' in Chart II-6 denotes the result of the interest rate shock only. The 'o' combines the interest rate shock with a recession scenario, in which EBIT contracts by 15%. The interest coverage ratio declines sharply when rates rise by 100 basis points, but the ratio moves to a new post-2000 low only for foreign issuers. The ratio for domestic issuers falls back to the range that existed between 2009 and 2013. The median interest coverage ratio drops further when we combine this with a 15% earnings contraction in the recession scenario. Again, the outcome is far worse for foreign than it is for domestic issuers. Chart II-7 presents a shock to the median debt coverage ratio. Since debt coverage (cash flow divided by total debt) does not include interest payments, we show only the recession scenario result that reflects the decline in profits. Once again, foreign issuers appear to be far more exposed to an economic downturn than their domestic brethren. Chart II-6Interest Coverage Shocks Chart II-7Debt Coverage Shock Indeed, the results for foreign issuers are qualitatively similar to the shocks we previous published for our bottom-up sample of IG corporates in the U.S. (Chart II-8 and Chart II-9). In both cases, higher interest rates and contracting earnings will take the interest coverage and debt coverage ratios into uncharted territory. Chart II-8U.S. Interest Coverage Shocks Chart II-9U.S. Debt Coverage Shock Conclusions European corporations are still well behind the U.S. in the leveraging cycle. Relative trends in corporate financial health have generally favored European credit quality relative to U.S. issuers, where balance sheet activity has focused on lifting shareholder value since the last recession. Below the surface, balance sheet repair in the Eurozone has been concentrated in domestic issuers; financial trends among foreign issuers have resembled those in the U.S. market. There has been a small convergence of financial health between Eurozone domestic and foreign issuers over the past year or so, but the latter are still much more vulnerable to higher interest rates and an economic downturn. Interest- and debt-coverage ratios are likely to fall to levels that will spark a raft of downgrades for foreign firms issuing into the Eurozone market, in the event that interest rates rise and a recession follows. Investors should concentrate their European corporate bond portfolios in domestic securities. That said, trends in financial health are unlikely to be the key driver of corporate bond returns relative to European government bonds or to U.S. corporates this year. More important will be the end of the ECB's asset purchase program later in 2018. We expect spreads to widen as this important liquidity tailwind fades. For the moment, our Global Fixed Income Strategy service recommends an underweight position in Eurozone IG and HY relative to Eurozone government bonds, and relative to U.S. corporates. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 Standardizing involves taking the deviation of the series from the 18 quarter moving average and dividing by the standard deviation of the series. 2 Note that a rising CHM indicates deteriorating health to facilitate comparison with quality spreads.
Bank Credit Analyst Highlights The risk/reward balance for risk assets remains unappealing this month, even though our base-case outlook sees them outperforming cash and bonds over the next 6-12 months. The number of items that could take equity markets to new highs appears to fall well short of the number of potential landmines that could take markets down. Tensions vis-à-vis North Korea have eased, but the U.S./China trade war is heating up. Trump's voter base and many in Congress want the President to push China harder. Eurozone "breakup risk" has reared its ugly head once again. The Italian President is trying to install a technocratic government, but the interim between now and a likely summer election will extend the campaign period during which the two contending parties have an incentive to continue with hyperbolic fiscal proposals. The next Italian election is not a referendum on exiting the EU or Euro Area. Nonetheless, the risks posed by the Italian political situation may not have peaked, especially since Italy's economic growth appears set to slow. We are underweight both Italian government bonds and equities within global portfolios. It is also disconcerting that we have passed the point of maximum global growth momentum. We expect growth to remain above-trend in the advanced economies, but the economic data will be less supportive of global risk assets than was the case last year. One reason for the economic "soft patch" is that the Chinese economy continues to decelerate. Our indicators suggest that growth will moderate further, with negative implications for the broader emerging market complex. Dearer oil may also be starting to bite, although prices have not increased enough to derail the expansion in the developed economies. This is especially the case in the U.S., where the shale industry is gearing up. Last year's "global synchronized growth" story is showing signs of wear. While the U.S. economy will enjoy a strong rebound in the second quarter, leading economic indicators in most of the other major countries have rolled over. Similar divergences are occurring in the inflation data. The international growth and inflation decoupling is probably not over, which means that long-dollar positions should continue to pay off in the coming months. U.S. inflation is almost back to target and the FOMC signaled that an overshoot will be tolerated. Policymakers will likely transition from "normalizing" policy to targeting slower economic growth once long-term inflation expectations return to the 2.3%-2.5% range. The advanced stage of the U.S. business cycle, heightened geopolitical risks and our bias for capital preservation keep us tactically cautious on risk assets again this month. Feature The major stock indexes are struggling, even though 12-month forward earnings estimates continue to march higher (Chart I-1). One problem is that a lot of good earnings news was discounted early in the year. The number of items that could take markets to new highs appear to fall well short of the number of potential landmines that could take markets down. Not the least of which is ongoing pain in emerging markets and the return of financial stress in Eurozone debt markets. Last month's Overview highlighted the unappealing risk/reward balance for risk assets, even though our base-case outlook sees them outperforming cash and bonds over the next 6-12 months. The advanced stage of the business cycle and our bias for capital preservation motivated us to heed the recent warnings from our growth indicators and 'exit' timing checklist. We also were concerned about a raft of geopolitical tensions. Fast forward one month and the backdrop has not improved. Our Equity Scorecard Indicator edged up, but is still at a level that historically was consistent with poor returns to stocks and corporate bonds (see Chart I-1 in last month's Overview). Our 'exit' checklist is also signaling that caution is warranted (Table I-1). Meanwhile, the "global synchronized expansion" theme that helped to drive risk asset prices higher last year is beginning to unravel and trade tensions are escalating. Chart I-1Struggling To Make Headway Table I-1Exit Checklist For Risk Assets U.S./Sino Trade War Is Back? The "on again/off again" trade war between the U.S. and China is on again as we go to press. Investors breathed a sigh of relief in mid-May when the Trump Administration signaled that China's minor concessions were sufficient to avoid the imposition of onerous new tariffs. However, the proposed deal did not go down well with many in the U.S., including some in the Republican Party. The President was criticized for giving up too much in order to retain China's help in dealing with North Korea. Trump might have initially cancelled the summit with Kim in order to send a message to China that he is still prepared to play hard ball on trade, despite the North Korean situation. We expect that U.S./North Korean negotiations will soon begin, and that Pyongyang will not be a major threat to global financial markets for at least the near term. It is a different story for U.S./China relations. Trump's voter base and many in Congress on both sides of the isle want the President to push China harder. This is likely to be a headwind for risk assets at least until the U.S. mid-term elections. The Return Of Eurozone Breakup Risk Turning to the Eurozone, "breakup risk" has reared its ugly head once again. Italian President Sergio Mattarella's decision to reject a proposed cabinet minister has led to the collapse of the populist coalition between the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) and the euroskeptic League. President Mattarella's choice for interim-prime minister, Carlo Cottarelli, is unlikely to last long. It is highly unlikely that he will be able to receive parliamentary support for a technocratic mandate, given the fact that he cut government spending during a brief stint in government from 2013-14. As such, elections are likely this summer. Chart I-2Italy: No Euro Support Rebound Investors continue to fret for two reasons. First, the interim period will extend the campaign period during which both M5S and the League have an incentive to continue with hyperbolic fiscal proposals. Second, M5S has suggested that it will try to impeach Mattarella, a long and complicated process that would heighten political risk, though it will likely fail in our view. As our geopolitical strategists have emphasized throughout 2017, Italy will eventually be the source of a major global risk-off event because it is the one outstanding major European country capable of reigniting the Euro Area break-up crisis.1 While a majority of Italians support the euro, they are less supportive than any other major European country, including Greece (Chart I-2). Meanwhile a plurality of Italians is confident that the future would be brighter if Italy were an independent country outside of the EU. That said, the next election is not a referendum on exiting the EU or Euro Area. The current conflict arises from the coalition wanting to run large budget deficits in violation of Europe's Stability and Growth Pact fiscal rules. Given that the costs of attempting to exit the Euro Area are extremely severe for Italy's households and savers, and that even the Five Star Movement has moderated its previous skepticism about the euro for the time being, it is likely going to require a recession or another crisis to cause Italy seriously contemplate an exit. We are still several steps away from such a move. Nonetheless, the risks posed by the Italian political situation may not have peaked. Italy's leading economic indicator points to slowing growth, which will intensify the populist push for aggressive fiscal stimulus. We are underweight both Italian government bonds and equities within global portfolios. Global Growth Has Peaked Chart I-3Past The Point Of Max Growth Momentum It is also disconcerting that we have passed the point of maximum global growth momentum, as highlighted by the indicators shown in Chart I-3. We expect growth to remain above-trend in the advanced economies, but the economic data will be less supportive of global risk assets than was the case last year. What is behind this year's loss of momentum? First, growth in 2017 was flattered by a rebound from the oil-related manufacturing recession of 2015/16. That rebound is now topping out, while worries regarding a trade war are undoubtedly weighing on animal spirits and industrial activity. Second, the Eurozone economy was lifted last year by the previous recapitalization of parts of the banking system, which allowed some pent-up credit demand to be satiated. This growth impulse also appears to have peaked, which helps to explain the sharp drop in some of the Eurozone's key economic indicators. Still, we do not expect European growth to slip back below a trend pace on a sustained basis unless the Italian situation degenerates so much that contagion causes significantly tighter financial conditions for the entire Eurozone economy. The third factor contributing to the global growth moderation is China. The Chinese economy surged in 2017 in a lagged response to fiscal and monetary stimulus in 2016, as highlighted by the Li Keqiang Index (LKI) and import growth (Chart I-4). Both are now headed south as the policy backdrop turned less supportive. Downturns in China's credit and fiscal impulses herald a deceleration in capital spending and construction activity (Chart I-4, bottom panel). The LKI has a strong correlation with ex-tech earnings and import growth. In turn, the latter is important for the broader EM complex that trade heavily with China. Weaker Chinese import growth has also had a modest negative impact on the developed world (Chart I-5). We estimate that, for the major economies, the contribution to GDP growth of exports to China has fallen from 0.3 percentage points last year to 0.1 percentage points now.2 Japan and Australia have been hit the hardest, but the Eurozone has also been affected. Interestingly, U.S. exports to China have bucked the trend so far. Chart I-4China Growth Slowdown... Chart I-5...Is Weighing On Global Activity China is not the only story because the slowdown in global trade activity in the first quarter was broadly based (Chart I-5). Nonetheless, softer aggregate demand growth out of China helps to explain why manufacturing PMIs and industrial production growth in most of the major developed economies have cooled. Our model for the LKI is still moderating. We do not see a hard economic landing, but our analysis points to further weakening in Chinese imports and thus softness in global exports and manufacturing activity in the coming months. Oil's Impact On The Economy... Finally, oil prices are no doubt taking a bite out of consumer spending power as Brent fluctuates just below $80/bbl. Our energy experts expect the global crude market to continue tightening due to robust growth and ongoing geopolitical tensions. Chief among these are the continuing loss of Venezuelan crude production and the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran. At the same time, we expect OPEC 2.0 to keep its production cuts in place in the second half of the year. Increasing shale output will not be enough to prevent world oil prices from rising in this environment, and we expect oil prices to continue to trend higher through 2018 and into early 2019 (Chart I-6). Brent could touch $90/bbl next year. There are a few ways to gauge the size of the oil shock on the economy. Chart I-7 shows the U.S. and global 'oil bill' as a share of GDP. We believe that both the level and the rate of change are important. Price spikes, even from low levels, do not allow energy users the time to soften the blow by shifting to alternative energy sources. Chart I-6Oil: Stay Bullish Chart I-7The Oil Bill The level of the oil bill is not high by historical standards. The increase in the bill over the past year has been meaningful, both for the U.S. and at the global level, but is still a long way from the oil shocks of the 1970s. U.S. consumer spending on energy as a share of disposable income, at about 4%, is also near the lowest level observed over the past 4-5 decades (Chart I-8). The 2-year swing in this series shows that rapid increases in energy-related spending has preceded slowdowns in economic growth, even from low starting points. The swing is currently back above the zero line but, again, it is not at a level that historically was associated with a significant economic slowdown. Chart I-8Oil's Impact On U.S. Consumer Spending Moreover, the mushrooming shale oil and gas industry has altered the calculus of oil shocks for the U.S. The plunge in oil prices in 2014-16 was accompanied by a manufacturing and profit mini recession in the developed countries, providing a drag on overall GDP growth. Chart I-9 provides an estimate of the contribution to U.S. growth from the oil and gas industry. We have included capital spending and wages & salaries in the calculation, and scaled it up to include spillover effects on other industries. Chart I-9Oil's Impact On Consumer Spending And Shale The oil and gas contribution swung from +0.5 percentage points in 2012 to -0.4 percentage points in 2016. The contribution has since become only slightly positive again, but it is likely to rise further unless oil prices decline in the coming months. We have included the annual swing in consumer spending on energy as a percent of GDP in Chart I-9 (inverted) for comparison purposes. At the moment, the impact on growth from the shale industry is roughly offsetting the negative impact on consumer spending. The bottom line is that the rise in oil prices so far is enough to take the edge off of global growth, but it is not large enough to derail the expansion in the developed countries. This is especially the case in the U.S., where the shale industry is gearing up. ...And Asset Prices As for the impact on asset prices, it is important to ascertain whether rising oil prices represent more restrictive supply or expanding demand. A mild rise in oil prices might simply be a symptom of increased demand caused by accelerating global growth. Higher oil prices are thus reflective of robust demand, and thus should not be seen as a threat. In contrast, the 1970s experience shows that supply restrictions can send the economy into a tailspin. In order to separate the two drivers of prices, we regressed WTI oil prices on global oil demand, inventories and the U.S. dollar. By excluding supply-related factors such as production restrictions, the residual of the regression model gives an approximate gauge of supply shocks (panel 2, Chart I-10). This model clearly has limitations, but it also has one key benefit: it estimates not just actual disruptions in supply, but also the premium built into prices due to perceived or expected future supply disruptions. For example, the 1990 price spike appears as quite a substantial deviation from what could be explained by changes in demand alone. Similar negative supply shocks are evident in 2000 and 2008. Chart I-10Identifying Supply Shocks In The Oil Market We then examined the impact that supply shocks have on subsequent period returns for both Treasury and risk assets. We divided the Supply Shock Proxy into four quartiles corresponding to the four zones shown in Chart I-10: strong positive shock, mild positive shock, mild negative shock and strong negative shock; the last of these corresponds to the region above the upper dashed line, which we have shaded in the chart. The performance of risk assets does not vary significantly across the bottom three quartiles of the supply shock indicator (Chart I-11). However, performance drops off precipitously in the presence of a strong negative supply shock. This is consistent with the "choke point" argument: investors are initially unconcerned with a modest appreciation in oil prices. It is only when prices are driven sharply above the level consistent with the current demand backdrop that risk assets begin to discount a more pessimistic future. The total returns to the Treasury index behave in the opposite manner (Chart I-12). Treasury returns are below average when the oil shock indicator is below one (i.e. positive supply shock) and above average when oil prices rise into negative supply shock territory. In other words, an excess of oil supply is Treasury bearish, as it would tend to fuel more robust economic growth. Conversely, a supply shock that drives oil prices higher tends to be Treasury bullish. This may seem counterintuitive because higher oil prices can be inflationary and thus should be bond bearish in theory. However, large negative oil supply shocks have usually preceded recessions, which caused Treasurys to rally. Chart I-11Effect On Risk Assets Chart I-12Effect On Treasurys The model clearly shows that the drop in oil prices in 2014/15 was a positive supply shock, consistent with the oil consumption data that show demand growth was fairly stable through that period. The model indicator has moved up toward the neutral line in recent months, suggesting that the supply side of the market is tightening up, but it is still in "mild positive supply shock" territory. The latest data point available is April, which means that it does not capture the surge in oil prices over the past month. Some of the recent jump in prices is clearly related to the cancelled Iran deal and other supply-related factors, although demand continues to be supportive of prices. The implication of this model is that it will probably require a significant further surge in prices, without a corresponding ramp up in oil demand, for the model to signal that supply constraints are becoming a significant threat for risk assets. A rise in Brent above US$85 would signal trouble according to this model. As for government bonds, rising oil prices are bearish in the near term, irrespective of whether it reflects demand or supply factors. This is because of the positive correlation between oil prices and long-term inflation expectations. The oil bull phase will turn bond-bullish once it becomes clear that energy prices have hit an economic choke point. Desynchronization Last year's "global synchronized growth" story is showing signs of wear. First quarter U.S. GDP growth was underwhelming, but the long string of first-quarter disappointment points to seasonal adjustment problems. Higher frequency data are consistent with a robust rebound in the second quarter. Forward looking indicators, such as the OECD and Conference Board's Leading Economic Indicators, continue to climb. This is in contrast with some of the other major economies, such as the Eurozone, U.K., Australia and Japan (Chart I-13). First quarter real GDP growth was particularly soft in Japan and the Eurozone, and one cannot blame seasonal adjustment in these cases. Chart I-13Growth & Inflation Divergences The divergence in economic performance likely reflects Washington's fiscal stimulus that is shielding the U.S. from the global economic soft patch. Moreover, the U.S. is less exposed to the oil shock and the China slowdown than are the other major economies. Similar divergences are occurring in the inflation data. While U.S. inflation continues to drift higher, it has lost momentum in the euro area, Japan and the U.K. (Chart I-13). Renewed stresses in the Italian and Spanish bond markets have sparked a flight-to-quality in recent trading days, depressing yields in safe havens such as U.S. Treasurys and German bunds. Nonetheless, prior to that, the divergence in growth and inflation was reflected in widening bond yield spreads as U.S. Treasurys led the global yields higher. Long-term inflation expectations have risen everywhere, but real yields have increased the most in the U.S. (prior to the flight-to-quality bond rally at the end of May). This is consistent with the growth divergence story and with our country bond allocation: overweight the U.K., Australia and Japan, and underweight U.S. Treasurys within hedged global portfolios. The dollar lagged earlier this year, but is finally catching up to the widening in interest rate spreads. The international growth and inflation decoupling is probably not over, which means that long-dollar positions should continue to pay off in the coming months. Expect More Pain In EM Dollar strength and rising U.S. bond yields are a classic late-cycle combination that often spells trouble for emerging market assets. We do not see the recent selloff across EM asset classes as a buying opportunity since markets have only entered the first stage of the classic final chapter; EM assets underperform as U.S. bond yields and the dollar rise, but commodity prices are resilient. In the second phase, U.S. bond yields top out, but the U.S. dollar continues to firm and commodity prices begin their descent. If the current slowdown in Chinese growth continues, as we expect, it will begin to weigh on non-oil commodity prices. Thus, emerging economies may have to deal with a deadly combination of rising U.S. interest rates, a stronger greenback, falling commodity prices and slowing exports to China (Chart I-14). Which countries are most exposed to lower foreign funding? BCA's Emerging Market Strategy services has ranked EM countries based on foreign funding requirements (Chart I-15). The latter is calculated as the current account balance plus foreign debt that is due in the coming months. Chart I-14EM Currencies Exposed To China Slowdown Chart I-15Vulnerability Ranking: Dependence On Foreign Funding Turkey, Malaysia, Peru and Chile have the heaviest foreign funding requirements in the next six months. These mostly stem from foreign debt obligations by their banks and companies. Even though most companies and banks with foreign debt will not default, their credit spreads will likely widen as it becomes more difficult to service the foreign debt.3 It is too early to build positions even in Turkish assets. Our EM strategists believe that it will require an additional 15% depreciation in the lira versus an equal-weighted basket of the dollar and euro, in combination with 200-250 basis points hike in the policy rate, and a 20% drop in share prices in local currency terms, to create a buying opportunity in Turkish financial instruments. FOMC Expects Inflation Overshoot Escalating turmoil in EM financial markets could potentially lead the Federal Reserve to put the rate hike campaign on hold. However, that would require some signs of either domestic financial stress or slowing growth. The FOMC is monitoring stress in emerging markets and in the Eurozone, but is sticking with its "gradual" tightening pace for now (i.e. 25 basis points per quarter). May's FOMC minutes signaled a rate hike in June. However, the minutes did not suggest that the Fed is getting more hawkish, despite the Staff's forecast that growth will remain above trend and that the labor market will continue to tighten at a time when core inflation is already pretty much back to target. Some inflation indicators, such as the New York Fed's Inflation Gauge, suggest that core inflation will overshoot. The minutes signaled that policymakers are generally comfortable with a modest overshoot of the 2% inflation target because many see it as necessary in order to shift long-term inflation expectations higher, into a range that is consistent with meeting the 2% inflation target on a "sustained" basis (we estimate this range to be 2.3-2.5% for the 10-year inflation breakeven rate). The fact that the FOMC took a fairly dovish tone and did not try to guide rate expectations higher contributed to some retracement of the Treasury selloff in recent weeks. Nonetheless, an inflation overshoot and rising inflation expectations will ultimately be bond-bearish, especially when the FOMC is forced to clamp down on growth as long-term inflation expectations reach the target range. As discussed in BCA's Outlook 2018, one of our key themes for the year is that risk assets are on a collision course with monetary policy because the FOMC will eventually have to transition from simply removing accommodation to targeting slower growth. Timing that transition will be difficult, and depends importantly on how much of an inflation overshoot the FOMC is prepared to tolerate. Is 2½% reasonable? Or could inflation go to 3%? The makeup of the FOMC has changed, but we expect Janet L. Yellen4 to shed light on this question when she speaks at the BCA Annual Investment Conference in September. Investment Conclusions The risks facing investors have shifted, but we do not feel any less cautious than we did last month. Geopolitical tensions vis-à-vis North Korea have perhaps eased. But trade tensions are escalating and investors are suddenly faced with another chapter in the Eurozone financial crisis. The major fear in the first and second chapters was that bond investors would attack Italy, given the sheer size of that economy and the size of Italian government debt. That dreadful day has arrived. The profit backdrop in the major economies remains constructive for equity markets. However, even there, the bloom is coming off the rose. Global growth is no longer synchronized and the advanced economies have hit a soft patch with the possible exception of the U.S. While far from disastrous, our short-term profit models appear to be peaking across the major countries (Chart I-16). Chart I-16Profit Growth: Solid, But Peaking The typical U.S. late cycle dynamics are also threatening emerging markets, at a time when investors are generally overweight and many EM countries have accumulated a pile of debt. U.S. inflation is set to overshoot the target, the FOMC is tightening and the dollar is rising. Throw in slowing Chinese demand and the EM space looks highly vulnerable. If the global economic slowdown is pronounced and drags the U.S. down with it, then bonds will rally and risk assets will take a hit. If, instead, the soft patch is short-lived and growth re-accelerates, then the U.S. Treasury bear market will resume. Stock indexes and corporate bond excess returns would enjoy one last upleg in this scenario, but downside risks would escalate once the Fed begins to target slower economic growth. Either way, EM assets would be hit. Our base case remains that stocks will beat government bonds and cash on a 6-12 month horizon. However, the risk/reward balance is unattractive given the geopolitical backdrop. Thus, we remain tactically cautious on risk assets for the near term. We still expect that the 10-year Treasury yield will peak at close to 3½% before this economic expansion is over. Nonetheless, this would require a calming of geopolitical tensions and an upturn in the growth indicators in the developed world. The risk/reward tradeoff for corporate bonds is no better than for equities and we urge caution in the near term. On a 6-12 month cyclical horizon, we still expect corporate bonds to outperform government bonds, at least in the U.S. European corporates are subject to the ebb and flow of the Italian bond crisis, and face the added risk that the ECB will likely end its QE program later this year. Looking further ahead, this month's Special Report, beginning on page 19, analyzes the Eurozone corporate sector's vulnerability to the end of the cycle that includes rising interest rates and, ultimately, a recession. We find that domestic issuers into the Eurozone market are far less exposed than are foreign issuers. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst May 31, 2018 Next Report: June 28, 2018 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 2016, available on gps.bcaresearch.com 2 This underestimates the impact on the major countries because it does not account for third country effects (i.e. trade with other countries that trade with China). 3 For more information, please see BCA Emerging Market Strategy Weekly Report, "The Dollar Rally And China's Imports," dated May 24, 2018, available on ems.bcaresearch.com 4 Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System (2014-2018). II. Leverage And Sensitivity To Rising Rates: The Eurozone Corporate Sector As interest rates rise, investors are looking for the leveraged pressure points in the global economy to identify the sectors most likely to show strain. We previously identified the U.S. corporate bond market as a definite candidate. This month we look at European corporates. European corporations are still well behind the U.S. in the leveraging cycle. Relative trends in corporate financial health have generally favored European credit quality relative to U.S. issuers. Below the surface, balance sheet repair in the Eurozone has been concentrated in domestic issuers; financial trends among foreign issuers have resembled those in the U.S. market. Foreign issuers are much more vulnerable to higher interest rates and an economic downturn. Interest- and debt-coverage ratios are likely to fall to levels that will spark a raft of downgrades for foreign firms issuing into the Eurozone market, in the event that interest rates rise and a recession follows. Investors should concentrate their European corporate bond portfolios in domestic securities. That said, trends in financial health are unlikely to be the key driver of corporate bond relative returns this year. More important will be the end of the ECB's asset purchase program. We recommend an underweight position in Eurozone IG and HY relative to Eurozone government bonds, and relative to U.S. corporates. Risk assets remain on a collision course with monetary policy, which is the main reason why the "return of vol" is a key theme in the BCA 2018 Outlook. In the U.S., rising inflation is expected to limit the FOMC's ability to cushion soft patches in the economic data or negative shocks from abroad. We expect that ECB tapering will add to market stress, especially now that Eurozone breakup risks are again a concern. We also believe that geopolitics will remain a major source of uncertainty and volatility. All this comes at a time when corporate bond spreads offer only a thin buffer against bad news. On a positive note, we remain upbeat on the earnings outlook in the major countries. The U.S. recession that we foresaw in 2019 has been delayed into 2020 by fiscal stimulus. The longer runway for earnings to grow keeps us nervously overweight corporate bonds, at least in the U.S. That said, corporates are no more than a carry trade now that the lows in spreads are in place for the cycle. We are keeping a close eye on a number of indicators that will help us to time the next downgrade to our global corporate bond allocation. Profitability is just one, albeit important, aspect of the financial backdrop. What about the broader trend in financial health? Does the trend justify wider spreads even if the economy and profits hold up over the next year? We reviewed U.S. corporate financial health in the March 2018 monthly Bank Credit Analyst, using our bottom-up sample of companies. We also stress-tested these companies for higher interest rates and a medium-sized recession. We concluded that the U.S. corporate sector's heavy accumulation of debt in this expansion will result in rampant downgrade activity during the next economic downturn. As interest rates rise, investors are looking for the leveraged pressure points in the global economy to identify the sectors most likely to show strain. The U.S. corporate bond market is a definite candidate. This month we extend the analysis to the European corporate sector. The European Corporate Health Monitor The bottom-up version of the Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) is a complement to our top-down CHM, which uses macro data from the ECB to construct an index of six financial ratios for the non-financial corporate sector. While useful as an indicator of the overall trend in corporate financial health, it does not shed light on underlying trends across credit quality, countries and sectors. It also fails to distinguish between domestic versus foreign issuers in the Eurozone market. A number of features of the European market limit the bottom-up analysis to some extent relative to what we are able to do for the U.S.: the Eurozone market is significantly smaller and company data typically do not have as much history; foreign issuers comprise almost 50% of the market, a much higher percentage than in the U.S.; and the Financial sector features more prominently in the Eurozone index, but we exclude it because our CHM methodology does not lend itself well to this sector. We analyzed only domestic issuers in our study of U.S. corporate health. However, we decided to include foreign issuers in our Eurozone analysis in order to maximize the sample size. Moreover, it is appropriate for some bond investors to consider the whole picture, given that important benchmarks such as Barclay's corporate indexes include both foreign and domestic issuers. The relative composition of domestic versus foreign, investment-grade versus high-yield, and industrial sectors in our sample are comparable with the weights used in the Barclay's index. The CHM is calculated using the median value for each of six financial ratios (Table II-1). We then standardize1 the median values for the six ratios and aggregate them into a composite index using a simple average. The result is an index that fluctuates between +/- 2 standard deviations. A rising index indicates deteriorating health, while a downtrend signals improving health. We defined it this way in order to facilitate comparison with trends in corporate spreads. Table II-1Definitions Of Ratios That Go Into The CHMs One has to be careful in interpreting our Eurozone Monitor. The bottom-up version only dates back to 2005. Thus, while both the level and change in the U.S. CHM provide important information regarding balance sheet health, for the Eurozone Monitor we focus more on the change. Whether it is a little above or below the zero line is less important than the trend. Top-Down Versus Bottom-Up Chart II-1 compares the top-down and bottom-up Eurozone CHMs for the entire non-financial corporate sector.2 The levels are different, although the broad trends are similar. Key differences that help to explain the divergence include the following: the top-down CHM defines leverage to be total debt as a percent of the market value of equity, while our bottom-up CHM defines it to be total debt as a percent of the book value of the company. The second panel of Chart II-1 highlights that the two measures of leverage have diverged significantly since 2012; the top-down CHM defines profit margins as total cash flow as a percent of sales. For data-availability reasons, our bottom-up version uses operating income/total sales; and most importantly, the top-down CHM uses ECB data, which includes only companies that are domiciled in the Eurozone. Thus, it excludes foreign issuers that make up a large part of our company sample and the Barclay's index. When we recalculate the bottom-up CHM using only domestic investment-grade issuers, the result is much closer to the top-down version (Chart II-2). Both CHMs have been in 'improving health' territory since the end of the Great Financial Crisis. The erosion in the profitability components during this period was offset by declining leverage, rising liquidity and improving interest coverage for domestic issuers. Chart II-1Top-Down Vs. Bottom-Up Chart II-2Top-Down Vs. Domestic Bottom-Up It has been a different story for foreign IG issuers (Chart II-3). These firms have historically enjoyed a higher return on capital, operating margins, interest coverage, debt coverage and liquidity. Nonetheless, heavy debt accumulation has undermined their interest- and debt-coverage ratios in absolute terms and relative to their domestic peers until very recently. In other words, while domestic issuers have made an effort to clean up their balance sheets since the Great Recession, financial trends among foreign issuers look more like the trends observed in the U.S. No doubt, this is in part due to U.S. companies issuing Euro-denominated debt, but there are many other foreign issuers in our sample as well. Some analysts prefer total debt/total assets to the leverage measure we use in constructing our CHMs. However, the picture is much the same; leverage among IG domestic and foreign firms has diverged dramatically since 2010 (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Bottom-Up: Domestic Vs. Foreign IG Chart II-4Diverging Leverage Trends Over the past year or so there has been some reversal in the post-Lehman trends; domestic health has stabilized, while that of foreign issuers has improved. Leverage among foreign companies has leveled off, while margins and the liquidity ratio have bounced. The results for high-yield (HY) issuers must be taken with a grain of salt because of the small sample size. Chart II-5 highlights that the HY CHM is improving for both domestic and foreign issuers. Impressively, leverage is declining for both the domestic and foreign components. The return on capital, interest coverage, and debt coverage have also improved, although only for foreign issuers. Chart II-5Bottom-Up: Domestic Vs. Foreign HY Corporate Sensitivity The bottom line is that, while there have been some relative shifts below the surface, the European corporate sector's finances are generally in good shape in absolute terms and relative to the U.S. This is particularly the case for domestic issuers that have yet to catch the equity buyback bug. However, less accommodative monetary policy and rising borrowing rates have focused investor attention on corporate sector vulnerability. Downgrade risk will mushroom if corporate borrowing rates continue rising and, especially, if the economy contracts. If there is a recession in Europe in the next few years it will likely be as a result of a downturn in the U.S. We expect a traditional end to the U.S. business cycle; the Fed overdoes the rate hike cycle, sending the economy into a tailspin. The U.S. downturn would spill over to the rest of the world and could drag the Eurozone into a mild contraction. We estimated the change in the interest coverage ratio for the companies in our bottom-up European sample for a 100 basis-point rise in interest rates across the corporate curve, taking into consideration the maturity distribution of the debt (i.e. the coupons reset only for the bonds, notes and loans that mature in the next three years). We make the simplifying assumptions that all debt and loans maturing in the next three years are rolled over, but that companies do not take on net new obligations. We also assume that EBIT is unchanged in order to isolate the impact of higher interest rates. The 'x' in Chart II-6 denotes the result of the interest rate shock only. The 'o' combines the interest rate shock with a recession scenario, in which EBIT contracts by 15%. The interest coverage ratio declines sharply when rates rise by 100 basis points, but the ratio moves to a new post-2000 low only for foreign issuers. The ratio for domestic issuers falls back to the range that existed between 2009 and 2013. The median interest coverage ratio drops further when we combine this with a 15% earnings contraction in the recession scenario. Again, the outcome is far worse for foreign than it is for domestic issuers. Chart II-7 presents a shock to the median debt coverage ratio. Since debt coverage (cash flow divided by total debt) does not include interest payments, we show only the recession scenario result that reflects the decline in profits. Once again, foreign issuers appear to be far more exposed to an economic downturn than their domestic brethren. Chart II-6Interest Coverage Shocks Chart II-7Debt Coverage Shock Indeed, the results for foreign issuers are qualitatively similar to the shocks we previous published for our bottom-up sample of IG corporates in the U.S. (Chart II-8 and Chart II-9). In both cases, higher interest rates and contracting earnings will take the interest coverage and debt coverage ratios into uncharted territory. Chart II-8U.S. Interest Coverage Shocks Chart II-9U.S. Debt Coverage Shock Conclusions European corporations are still well behind the U.S. in the leveraging cycle. Relative trends in corporate financial health have generally favored European credit quality relative to U.S. issuers, where balance sheet activity has focused on lifting shareholder value since the last recession. Below the surface, balance sheet repair in the Eurozone has been concentrated in domestic issuers; financial trends among foreign issuers have resembled those in the U.S. market. There has been a small convergence of financial health between Eurozone domestic and foreign issuers over the past year or so, but the latter are still much more vulnerable to higher interest rates and an economic downturn. Interest- and debt-coverage ratios are likely to fall to levels that will spark a raft of downgrades for foreign firms issuing into the Eurozone market, in the event that interest rates rise and a recession follows. Investors should concentrate their European corporate bond portfolios in domestic securities. That said, trends in financial health are unlikely to be the key driver of corporate bond returns relative to European government bonds or to U.S. corporates this year. More important will be the end of the ECB's asset purchase program later in 2018. We expect spreads to widen as this important liquidity tailwind fades. For the moment, our Global Fixed Income Strategy service recommends an underweight position in Eurozone IG and HY relative to Eurozone government bonds, and relative to U.S. corporates. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 Standardizing involves taking the deviation of the series from the 18 quarter moving average and dividing by the standard deviation of the series. 2 Note that a rising CHM indicates deteriorating health to facilitate comparison with quality spreads. III. Indicators And Reference Charts The divergence between the U.S. corporate earnings data and our equity-related indicators continued in May. We remain cautious, despite the supportive profit backdrop. The U.S. net earnings revisions ratio fell a bit in May, but it remains well in positive territory. Forward earnings continued their ascent, and the net earnings surprise index rose further to within striking distance of the highest levels in the history of the series. Normally, an earnings backdrop this strong would justify an overweight equity allocation within a balanced portfolio. Unfortunately, a lot of good earnings news is discounted based on our Composite Valuation Indicator and extremely elevated 5-year bottom-up earnings growth expectations (see the Bank Credit Analyst Overview, May 2018). Moreover, our equity indicators are sending a cautious signal. Our U.S. Willingness-to-Pay indicator continued to decline in May. The WTP indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. U.S. flows have clearly turned negative for equities, although flows into European and Japanese markets are holding up for now. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) for stocks remained on its 'sell' signal in May, for the second month in a row. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. These indicators are not aligned at the moment, further supporting the view that caution is warranted. Moreover, our composite equity Technical Indicator is on the verge of breaking down and our Monetary Indicator moved further into negative territory in May. Meanwhile, market froth has not been completely extinguished according to our Speculation Indicator (which is a negative sign for stocks from a contrary perspective). As for bonds, the powerful rally at the end of May has undermined valuation, but the 10-year Treasury is not yet in expensive territory. Our technical indicator suggests that previously oversold conditions are easing, but bonds are a long way from overbought. This means that yields have room to fall further in the event of more bad news on Italy or on the broader geopolitical scene. The dollar has not yet reached overbought territory according to our technical indicator. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst
Special Report Highlights Trade war between China and U.S. is back on; President Trump is politically constrained from making a quick deal with China; Italian uncertainty will last through the summer and beyond; But bond market will eventually price profligacy over Euro Area exit, which favors bear steepening; A new election in Spain is market positive, there are no Euroskeptics in Iberia; Our tactical bearish view is playing out, stay long DXY and expect more summer volatility. Feature Geopolitical risks are rising across the board. This supports our tactically bearish view, elucidated in April.1 In this Client Note, we review our views on trade wars, Italy, and Spain. Is The U.S.-China Trade War Back On? Most relevant for global assets is that the first official salvo of the trade war between China and the U.S. has been fired: the White House announced, on May 29, tariffs on $50 billion worth of Chinese imports as well as yet-to-be-specified restrictions on Chinese investments in the U.S. and U.S. exports to China.2 We have long raised the alarm on U.S.-China relations, but President Trump threw us a curve-ball last week when Chinese and American negotiators issued a joint statement meant to soothe trade tensions. We responded that "we do not expect the truce to last long."3 Apparently it lasted merely eight days. The significance of the administration's about-face on trade is that it invalidates the conventional view that President Xi and Trump would promptly make a deal to ease tensions. Many of our clients have responded to our bearish view on Sino-American relations by suggesting that Beijing will simply offer to buy more "beef and Boeings," and that Trump will take the deal in order to declare a "quick win." The last ten days should put this view to rest. China did offer to buy more beef explicitly - with the offer of more Boeings also rumored - and yet President Trump rejected the deal. Why? Our suspicion is that President Trump was shocked by the backlash against the deal among Republicans in Congress and conservative commentators in the press. As we have argued since 2016, there is no political constraint to being tough on China on trade. This is a highly controversial view as many in the investment community agree with the narrative that the soybean lobby will prevent a trade war between the U.S. and China. President Trump's election, however, has revealed the preference of the median voter in the U.S. on trade. That preference is far less committed to free trade than previously assumed. Republicans in Congress, once staunch defenders of free trade, have therefore adjusted their policy preference, creating a political constraint to a quick deal with China. Bottom Line: Yes, the trade war is back on. We are re-opening our short China-exposed S&P 500 companies versus U.S. financials and telecoms. Is Italy Going To Leave The Euro Area? The Italian bond market is beginning to price severe geopolitical stress. The 10-year BTP spread versus German bunds has grown 98 basis points since the election (Chart 1), while the 2/10 BTP yield curve has nearly inverted (Chart 2). The latter suggests that investors are beginning to price in default risk, or rather Euro Area exit risk, over the next two years. Chart 1Probability Of Itexit Has Risen... Chart 2...But Two-Year Horizon Is Overstated We have long contended that Italy is the premier developed market political risk.4 Its level of Euroskepticism is empirically higher than that of the rest of Euro Area (Chart 3) and we have expected that Italy would eventually produce a global risk off. It is just not clear to us that this is the moment. Chart 3Italy: No Euro Support Rebound First, support for the Euro Area remains in the high 50% range and has largely bounced between 55-60% for several years. This is low relative to its Euro Area peers, prompting us to raise the alarm on Italy. But it is also still a majority, showing that Italians are not sold on leaving the Euro Area. Second, the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) has adjusted its policy towards the euro membership question in view of this polling. In other words, M5S is aware that the median Italian voter is not convinced that exiting the Euro Area is the right thing to do. We would argue that the anti-establishment parties performed well in this year's election precisely because of this strategic decision to abandon their Euroskeptic rhetoric on the currency union. Nonetheless, the deal that M5S signed to form a coalition with the far more Euroskeptic Lega was an aggressive deal that signals that Rome is preparing for a fight against Brussels, the ECB, and core Europe. The proposed tax cuts, unwinding of retirement reforms, and increases in social welfare spending would raise Italy's budget deficit from current 2.3% of GDP to above 7%. Given rules against such profligacy, and given Italy's high debt levels, the coalition might as well be proposing a Euro Area exit. There are three additional concerns aside from fiscal profligacy: New Election: President Sergio Mattarella's choice for interim prime minister - now that M5S and Lega have broken off their attempt to form a government - has no chance of gaining a majority in the current parliament. As such, the president is likely to call a new election. The leaders of M5S and the Lega, as well as the leaders of the center-left Democratic Party (DP), want the election to be held on July 29, ahead of the ferragosto holidays that shuts down the country in August.5 The market does not like the uncertainty of new election as the current M5S-Lega coalition looks likely to win again, only this time with even more seats. As such, the last thing investors want is a summer full of hyperbolic, populist, anti-establishment statements that will undoubtedly be part of the electoral campaigns. Polls: The two populist parties, M5S and the Lega, are gaining in the polls, particularly the latter, which is the more Euroskeptic (Chart 4). This suggests to investors that the more Euroskeptic approach is gaining support. Impeachment: The leader of M5S, Luigi Di Maio, has called for the impeachment of President Mattarella. Di Maio accused Mattarella of overstepping his constitutional responsibility when he denied the populist coalition's preferred candidate for economy minister, Paolo Savona. Impeachment would be a major concern for the markets as Mattarella's mandate is set to expire only in 2022, which means that he remains a considerable constraint on populism until then. Our reading is that Mattarella did not violate the constitution and that he is unlikely to be removed from power, even if the parliament does impeach him.6 Over the next month, investors will watch all three factors closely. In our view, it is positive that the election may take place over the summer - for the first time in Italy's history - as it would reduce the period of uncertainty. Second, it is understandable that investors will fret about Lega's rise in the polls. However, the closer Lega approaches M5S in the polls, the less likely the two parties will be to maintain their current coalition. At some point, it will not be in the interest of M5S to form a coalition with its chief opponent, especially if Lega gains support and therefore demands a greater share of power in the revised coalition deal. A much preferable coalition partner for M5S would be the center-left PD, which will be weaker, and hence more manageable, and would be a better ideological match. Therefore we believe that the market is getting ahead of itself. Italian policymakers are looking for a fight with Brussels, Berlin, and the ECB over fiscal room and profligacy. This is a fight that will take considerable time to resolve and should add a fiscal premium to the long-dated Italian bonds. In fact, May 29 had the biggest day-to-day selloff since 1993 (Chart 5). However, policymakers are not (yet) looking for exit from the Euro Area. As such, risk premium on the 10-year BTPs does make sense, but the sharp move on the 2-year notes is premature. Chart 4Italy's Populists Are Ascendant Chart 5Market's Reaction Is More Severe Than In 2011 Bottom Line: Italian policymakers are not looking to exit the Euro Area. Their fight with Brussels, Berlin, and the ECB will last throughout 2018 and makes it dangerous to try to "catch the falling knife" of the BTPs. However, expecting the yield curve to invert is premature as an Italian Euro Area exit over the next two years is unlikely. Over the next ten years, however, we would expect Italy to test the markets with a Euro Area exit attempt. We are sticking to our view that such an event is far more likely to occur following a recession than it is today. Is Spanish Election Threat The Same As Italy? Chart 6Spanish Election Is Market Positive Spain is having its own political crisis. The inconclusive June 2016 election produced a minority conservative government, with the center-right People's Party (PP) supported on critical matters by the center-left Socialist Party (PSOE). The leader of the PSOE, Pedro Sanchez, has decided to withdraw his support for the minority government due to alleged evidence of PP corruption, allegations that have dogged the conservatives for years. A vote of confidence on Friday could bring down the government. Why did the PSOE decide to challenge PP now? Because polls are showing that PP is in decline, as is, Podemos, the far-left party that nearly outperformed PSOE in the 2016 election (Chart 6). The greatest beneficiary of the political realignment in Spain, however, is Ciudadanos, a radically centrist and radically pro-European party that originated in Catalonia. Ciudadanos's official platform in the December 2017 regional elections in Catalonia was "Catalonia is my homeland, Spain is my country, and Europe is our future." New elections in Spain are likely to produce a highly pro-market outcome where the centrist and pro-EU Ciudadanos forms a coalition with PSOE. While such a coalition would lean towards more fiscal spending, it would not unravel the crucial structural reforms painfully implemented by Mariano Rajoy's conservative governments since 2012. It also is as far away from Euroskepticism as exists in Europe at the moment. Bottom Line: A new Spanish election would be a market-positive event. The country would have a more stable government, replacing the current minority PP government that has lost all its political capital after implementing painful structural reforms and being dogged by corruption allegations. There is no Euroskeptic political alternative in Spain at the moment. As such, we are recommending that clients go long 10-year Spanish government bonds against Italian.7 Any contagion from Italy to Spain is inappropriate politically and is a misapplied vestige of the early days of the Euro Area crisis when all peripheral bonds traded in concerto. As such, it should be faded. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Expect Volatility... Of Volatility," dated April 11, 2018, and "Are You Ready For 'Maximum Pressure?'" dated May 16, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 According to the White House statement, the specific list of covered imports subjected to tariffs will be announced on June 15. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Some Good News (Trade), Some Bad News (Italy)," dated May 23, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 2016 and "Europe's Divine Comedy Part II: Italy In Purgatorio," dated June 21, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Corriere Della Sera, "Governo: cresce l'ipotesi del voto il 29 luglio. Salvini: "Al voto con Savona candidato," dated May 29, 2018, available at www.corriere.it. 6 Like in the U.S., the threshold for impeachment in Italy is low. Both chambers of parliament merely have to impeach the president with a simple majority. However, in Italy, the trial is not held in the parliament, but rather by the Constitutional Court's 15 judges and an additional 16 specially appointed judges - selected randomly. It is highly unlikely that Mattarella, himself a previous member of the court, would be found guilty, particularly since he acted in accordance with presidential powers outlined in Article 87 of the constitution ("The President shall appoint State officials in the cases provided for by the law") and in accordance with precedent (in 1994, the president then refused to appoint Silvio Berlusconi's personal lawyer as the country's minister of justice). In addition, leader of Lega, Matteo Salvini, has stated that he would not want to see Mattarella impeached. This is likely because the process has a low probability of success. Furthermore, the president cannot disband the parliament and call new elections if impeachment proceedings begin against him. 7 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Hold, Close Or Switch: Reviewing Our Tactical Overlay Trades," dated May 29, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com.
Neutral In yesterday's Weekly Report, we pulled the trigger on our upgrade watch for the niche S&P homebuilding index,1 monetizing our 24% relative gains since the late-November 2017 inception. Three main reasons underpin our upgrade to a benchmark allocation: 1. Bond market selloff taking a breather, 2. Housing fundamentals remain robust and 3. Compelling valuations reflect most, if not all, of the bad news. With respect to the first of these, BCA's U.S. Bond Strategists believe that the likelihood of a near-term pullback in U.S. Treasury yields has increased. This should support continued gains in the MBA's mortgage purchase index, which has climbed to a fresh cycle high (top panel). Housing fundamentals have proven resilient; new home prices have exited the deflation zone versus existing home prices which is significant for the relative profitability of homebuilding stocks (second panel). Finally, relative valuations have undershot the historical mean on a price-to-sales basis with homebuilders trading at a 50% discount to the broad market (bottom panel). Bottom Line: We are acting on our upgrade alert in the S&P homebuilding index and lifting exposure to neutral. Please see this week's Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOME - DHI, LEN, PHM.
Special Report Highlights Investors are underestimating the risks of U.S.-Iran tensions; The Obama administration's 2015 deal resulted in Iran curbing aggressive regional behavior that threatened global oil supply; The U.S. negotiating position vis-à-vis Iran has not improved; Unlike North Korea, Iran can retaliate against the Trump administration's "Maximum Pressure" doctrine - particularly in Iraq; U.S.-Iran conflicts will negatively affect global oil supply, critical geographies, and sectarian tensions - hence a geopolitical risk premium is warranted. Average Brent and WTI oil prices should rise to $80/bbl and $72/bbl in 2019 even without adding the full range of events that will drive up the geopolitical risk premium. Risks lie to the upside. Feature Tensions between the U.S. and Iran snuck up on the markets (Chart 1), even though President Trump's policy agenda was well telegraphed via rhetoric, action, and White House personnel moves.1 Still, investors doubt the market relevance of the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the international agreement between Iran and the P5+1.2 Chart 1Iran: Nobody Was Paying Attention! Several reasons to fade the risks - and hence to fade any implications for global oil supply - have become conventional wisdom. These include the alleged ability of OPEC and Russia to boost production and Washington's supposed ineffectiveness without an internationally binding sanction regime. Our view is that investors and markets are underestimating the geopolitical, economic, and financial relevance of the U.S.-Iran tensions. First, the ideological rhetoric surrounding the original U.S.-Iran détente tends to be devoid of strategic analysis. Second, Iran's hard power capabilities are underestimated. Third, OPEC 2.0's ability to tap into its spare capacity is overestimated.3 To put some numbers on the difference between our view and the market's view, we rely on the implied option volatilities for crude oil futures.4 As Chart 2 illustrates, the oil markets are currently pricing in just under 30% probability that oil prices will exceed $80/bbl by year-end, and merely 14% that they will touch $90/bbl in the same timeframe. We believe these odds are too low and will take the other side of that bet. Chart 2The Market Continues To Underestimate High Oil Prices Why Did The U.S.-Iran Détente Emerge In 2015? Both detractors and defenders of the 2015 nuclear deal often misunderstand the logic of the deal. First, the defenders are wrong when they claim that the deal creates a robust mechanism that ensures that Iran will never produce a nuclear device. Given that the most critical components of the deal expire in 10 or 15 years, it is simply false to assert that the deal is a permanent solution. More importantly, Iran already reached "breakout capacity" in mid-2013, which means that it had already achieved the necessary know-how to become a nuclear power.5 We know because we wrote about it at the time, using the data of Iran's cumulative production of enriched uranium provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).6 In August 2013, Iran's stockpile of 20% enriched uranium, produced at the impregnable Fordow facility, reached 200kg (Chart 3). Chart 3Iran's Negotiating Leverage At that point, Israeli threats of attacking Iran became vacuous, as the Israeli air force lacked the necessary bunker-busting technology to penetrate Fordow.7 As we wrote in 2013, this critical moment gave Tehran the confidence to give up "some material/physical components of its nuclear program as it has developed the human capital necessary to achieve nuclear status."8 The JCPOA forced Iran to stop enriching uranium at the Fordow facility altogether and to give up its stockpile of uranium enriched at 20%. However, Iran only agreed to the deal because it had reached a level of technological know-how that has not been eliminated by mothballing centrifuges and "converting" facilities to civilian nuclear research. Iran is a nuclear power in all but name. Second, the detractors of the JCPOA are incorrect when they claim that Iran did not give up any regional hegemony when it signed the deal. This criticism focuses on Iran's expanded role in the Syrian Civil War since 2011, as well as its traditional patronage networks with the Lebanese Shia militants Hezbollah and with Yemen's Houthis. However, critics ignore several other, far more critical, fronts of Iranian influence: Strait of Hormuz: In 2012, Iran's nearly daily threats to close the Strait of Hormuz were very much a clear and present danger for global investors (Map 1). Although we argued in 2012 that Iran's capability was limited to a 10-day closure, followed by another month during which they could threaten the safe passage of vessels through the Strait, even such a short crisis would add a considerable risk premium to oil markets given that it would remove about 17-18 million bbl/day from global oil supply (Chart 4).9 Since 2012, Iran's capabilities to threaten the Strait have grown, while the West's anti-mine capabilities have largely stayed the same.10 Map 1Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province Is A Crucial Piece Of Real Estate Chart 4Geopolitical Crises And Global Peak Supply Losses Iraq: The key geographic buffer between Saudi Arabia and Iran is Iraq (Map 2). Iran filled the power vacuum created by the U.S. invasion almost immediately after Saddam Hussein's overthrow. It deployed members of the infamous Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) into Iraq to support the initial anti-American insurgency. Iran's support for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was critical following the American withdrawal in 2011, particularly as his government became increasingly focused on anti-Sunni insurgency. Map 2Iraq: A Buffer Between Saudi Arabia And Iran Bahrain: Home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Bahrain experienced social unrest in 2011. The majority of Bahrain's population are Shia, while the country is ruled by the Saudi-aligned, Sunni, Al Khalifa monarchy. The majority of Shia protests were at least rhetorically, and some reports suggest materially, supported by Iran. To quell the protests, and preempt any potential Iranian interference, Saudi Arabia intervened militarily with a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Peninsula Shield Force. Eastern Province: Similar to the unrest in Bahrain, Shia protests engulfed Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province in 2011. The province is highly strategic, as it is where nearly all of Saudi oil production, processing, and transportation facilities are located (Map 1). Like Bahrain, it has a large Shia population. Saudi security forces cracked down on the uprising and have continued to do so, with paramilitary operations lasting into 2017. While Iranian involvement in the protests is unproven, it has been suspected. Anti-Israel Rhetoric: Under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran threatened Israel with destruction on a regular basis. While these were mostly rhetorical attacks, the implication of the threat was that any attack against Iran and its nuclear facilities would result in retaliation against U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and Iraq and direct military action against Israel. Both defenders and detractors of the JCPOA are therefore mistaken. The JCPOA does not impact Iran's ability to achieve "breakout capacity" given that it already reached it in mid-2013. And Iran's regional influence has not expanded since the deal was signed in 2015. In fact, since the détente in 2015, and in some cases since negotiations between the Obama administration and Tehran began in 2013, Iran has been a factor of stability in the Middle East. Specifically, Iran has willingly: Stopped threatening the Strait of Hormuz (the last overt threats to close the Strait of Hormuz were made in 2012); Acquiesced to Nouri al-Maliki's ousting as Prime Minister of Iraq in 2014 and his replacement by the far more moderate and less sectarian Haider al-Abadi; Stopped meddling in Bahraini and Saudi internal affairs; Stopped threatening Israel's existence (although its material support for Hezbollah clearly continues and presents a threat to Israel's security); Participated in joint military operations with the U.S. military against the Islamic State, cooperation without which Baghdad would have most likely fallen to the Sunni radicals in late 2014. The final point is worth expanding on. After the fall of Mosul - Iraq's second largest city - to the Islamic State in May 2014, Iranian troops and military advisors on the ground in Iraq cooperated with the U.S. air force to arrest and ultimately reverse the gains by the radical Sunni terrorist group. Without direct Iranian military cooperation - and without Tehran's material and logistical support for the Iraqi Shia militias - the Islamic State could not have been eradicated from Iraq (Map 3). How did such a dramatic change in Tehran's foreign policy emerge between 2012 and 2015? Iranian leadership realized in 2012 that the U.S. military and economic threats against it were real. Internationally coordinated sanctions had a damaging effect on the economy, threatening to destabilize a regime that had experienced social upheaval in the 2009 Green Revolution (Chart 5). It therefore began negotiations almost immediately after the imposition of stringent economic sanctions in early and mid-2012.11 Map 3The Collapse Of A Would-Be Caliphate Chart 5Iran's Sanctions Had A Hard Bite To facilitate the negotiations, the Guardian Council of Iran disqualified President Ahmadinejad's preferred candidate for the 2013 Iranian presidential elections, while allowing Hassan Rouhani's candidacy.12 Rouhani, a moderate, won the June 2013 election in a landslide win, giving him a strong political mandate to continue the negotiations and, relatedly, to pursue economic development. Many commentators forget, however, that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei allowed Rouhani to run in the first place, knowing full well that he would likely win. In other words, Rouhani's victory revealed the preferences of the Iranian regime to negotiate and adjust its foreign policy. Bottom Line: The 2015 U.S.-Iran détente traded American acquiescence in Iranian nuclear development - frozen at the point of "breakout capacity" - in exchange for Iran's cooperation on a number of strategically vital regional issues. As such, focusing on just the JCPOA, without considering the totality of Iranian behavior before and since the deal, is a mistake. Iran curbed its influence in several regional hot spots - almost all of which are critical to global oil supply. The Obama administration essentially agreed to Iran becoming a de facto nuclear power in exchange for Iran backing away from aggressive regional behavior. This included Iran's jeopardizing the safe passage of oil through the Strait of Hormuz either by directly threatening to close the channel or through covert actions in Bahrain and the Eastern Province. The U.S. also drove Iran to accept a far less sectarian Iraq, by forcing out the ardently pro-Tehran al-Maliki and replacing him with a prime minister far more acceptable to Saudi Arabia and Iraqi Sunnis. Why Did The U.S. Chose Diplomacy In 2011? The alternative to the above deal was some sort of military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. The U.S. contemplated such action in late 2011. Two options existed, either striking Iran's facilities with its own military or allowing Israel to do it themselves. One reason to choose diplomacy and economic sanctions over war was the limited capability of Israel to attack Iran alone.13 Israel does not possess strategic bombing capability. As such, it would have required a massive air flotilla of bomber-fighters to get to the Iranian nuclear facilities. While the Israeli air force has the capability to reach Iranian facilities and bomb them, their effectiveness is dubious and the ability to counter Iranian retaliatory capacity with follow-up strikes is non-existent. The second was the fact that a U.S. strike against Iran would be exceedingly complex. Compared to previous Israeli strikes against nuclear facilities in Iraq (Operation Opera 1981) and Syria (Operation Outside The Box 2007), Iran presented a much more challenging target. Its superior surface-to-air missile capability would necessitate a prolonged, and dangerous, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) mission.14 In parallel, the U.S. would have to preemptively strike Iran's ballistic missile launching pads as well as its entire navy, so as to obviate Iran's ability to retaliate against international shipping or the U.S. and its allies in the region. The U.S. also had a strategic reason to avoid entangling itself in yet another military campaign in the Middle East. The public was war-weary and the Obama administration gauged that in a world where global adversaries like China and Russia were growing in geopolitical power, avoiding another major military confrontation in a region of decreasing value to U.S. interests (thanks partly to growing U.S. shale oil production) was of paramount importance (Chart 6). Notable in 2011 was growing Chinese assertiveness throughout East Asia (please see the Appendix). Particularly alarming was the willingness of Beijing to assert dubious claims to atolls and isles in the South China Sea, a globally vital piece of real estate (Diagram 1). There was a belief - which has at best only partially materialized - that if the United States divested itself of the Middle East, then it could focus more intently on countering China's challenge to traditional U.S. dominance in East Asia and the Pacific. Chart 6Great Power Competition Diagram 1South China Sea As Traffic Roundabout Bottom Line: The Obama administration therefore chose a policy of military posturing toward Iran to establish a credible threat. The military option was signaled in order to get the international community - both allies and adversaries - on board with tough economic sanctions. The ultimate deal, the JCPOA, did not give the U.S. and its allies everything they wanted precisely because they did not enter the negotiations from a position of preponderance of power. Critics of the JCPOA ignore this reality and assume that going back to the status quo ante bellum will somehow improve the U.S. negotiating position. It won't. What Happens If The U.S.-Iran Détente Ends? The Trump administration is serious about applying its Maximum Pressure tactics on Iran. Buoyed by the successful application of this strategy in North Korea, the White House believes that it can get a better deal with Tehran. We do not necessarily disagree. It is indeed true that the U.S. is a far more powerful country than Iran, with a far more powerful military. On a long enough timeline, with enough pressure, it ought to be able to force Tehran to concede, assuming that credible threats are used.15 Unlike the Obama administration, the Trump administration will presumably rely on Israel far less, and on its own military capability a lot more, to deliver those threats, which should be more effective. The problem is that the timeline on which such a strategy would work is likely to be a lot longer with Iran than with North Korea. This is because Iran's retaliatory capabilities are far greater than the one-trick-pony Pyongyang, which could effectively only launch ballistic missiles and threaten all-out war with U.S. and its regional allies.16 While those threats are indeed worrisome, they are also vacuous as they would lead to a total war in which the North Korean regime would meet its demise. Iran has a far more effective array of potential retaliation that can serve a strategic purpose without leading to total war. As we listed above, it could rhetorically threaten the Strait of Hormuz or attempt to incite further unrest in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province. The key retaliation could be to take the war to Iraq. The just-concluded election in Iraq appears to have favored Shia political forces not allied to Iran, including the Alliance Towards Reform (Saairun) led by the infamous cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr (Chart 7). Surrounding this election, various Iranian policymakers and military leaders have said that they would not allow Iraq to drift outside of Iran's sphere of influence, a warning to the nationalist Sadr who has fought against both the American and Iranian military presence in his country. Iraq is not only a strategic buffer between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two regional rivals, but also a critical source of global oil supply, having brought online about half as much new supply as U.S. shale since 2011 (Chart 8). If Iranian-allied Shia factions engage in an armed confrontation with nationalist Shias allied with Muqtada al-Sadr, such a conflict will not play out in irrelevant desert governorates, as the fight against the Islamic State did. Chart 7Iraqi Elections Favored Shiites But Not Iran Chart 8Iraq Critical To Global Oil Supply Instead, a Shia-on-Shia conflict would play out precisely in regions with oil production and transportation facilities. In 2008, for example, Iranian-allied Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki fought a brief civil war against Sadr's Mahdi Army in what came to be known as the "Battle of Basra." While Iran had originally supported Sadr in his insurgency against the U.S., it came to Maliki's support in that brief but deadly six-day conflict. Basra is Iraq's chief port through which much of the country's oil exports flow. Iraq may therefore become a critical battleground as Iran retaliates against U.S. Maximum Pressure. From Iran's perspective, holding onto influence in Iraq is critical. It is the transit route through which Iran has established an over-land connection with its allies in Syria and Lebanon (Map 4). Threatening Iraqi oil exports, or even causing some of the supply to come off-line, would also be a convenient way to reduce the financial costs of the sanctions. A 500,000 b/d loss of exports - at an average price of $70 per barrel (as Brent has averaged in 2018) - could roughly be compensated by an increase in oil prices by $10 per barrel, given Iran's total exports. As such, Iran, faced with lost supply due to sanctions, will have an incentive to make sure that prices go up (i.e., that rivals do not simply replace Iranian supply, keeping prices more or less level). The easiest way to accomplish this, to add a geopolitical risk premium to oil prices, is through the meddling in Iraqi affairs. Map 4Iran Needs Iraq To Project Power Through The Levant It is too early to forecast with a high degree of confidence precisely how the U.S.-Iran confrontation will develop. However, Diagram 2 offers our take on the path towards retaliation. Diagram 2Iran-U.S. Tensions Decision Tree The critical U.S. sanctions against Iran will become effective on November 4 (Box 1). We believe that the Trump administration is serious and that it will force European allies, as well as South Korea and Japan, to cease imports of oil from Iran. China will be much harder to cajole. BOX 1 Iranian Sanction Timeline President Trump issued a National Security Presidential Memorandum to re-impose all U.S. sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the JCPOA. The Office of Foreign Assets Control expects all sanctions lifted under the JCPOA to be re-imposed and in full effect after November 4, 2018. However, there are two schedules by which sanctions will be re-imposed, a 90-day and 180-day wind-down periods.1 Sanctions Re-Imposed After August 6, 2018 The first batch of sanctions that will be re-imposed will come into effect 90 days after the announced withdrawal from the JCPOA. These include: Sanctions on direct or indirect sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of several commodities (including gold), semi-finished metals, and industrial process software; Sanctions on the purchase or acquisition of U.S. dollar banknotes by the government of Iran; Sanctions on trade in Iranian currency and facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt; Sanctions on Iran's automotive sector; Sanctions on export or re-export to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts. Sanctions Re-Imposed After November 4, 2018 The second batch of sanctions will come into effect 180 days after the announced Trump administration JCPOA withdrawal decision. These include: Sanctions on Iranian port operators, shipping, and shipbuilding activities; Sanctions against petroleum-related transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), and National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC); Sanctions against the purchase of petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemical products from Iran; Sanctions on transactions and provision of financial messaging services by foreign financial institutions with the Central Bank of Iran; Sanctions on Iran's energy sector; Sanctions on the provision of insurance, reinsurance, and underwriting services. 1 Please see the U.S. Treasury Department, "Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Re-Imposition of Sanctions Pursuant to the May 8, 2018, National Security Presidential Memorandum Relating to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)," dated May 8, 2018, available at www.treasury.gov. By Q1 2019, the impact on Iranian oil exports will be clear. We suspect that Iran will, at that point, have the choice of either relenting to Trump's Maximum Pressure, or escalating tensions through retaliation. We give the latter a much higher degree of confidence and suspect that a cycle of retaliation and Maximum Pressure would lead to a conditional probability of war between Iran and the U.S. of around 20%. This is a significant number, and it is critical if President Trump wants to apply credible threats of war to Iran. Bottom Line: Unlike North Korea, Iran has several levers it can use to retaliate against U.S. Maximum Pressure. Iran agreed to set these levers aside as negotiations with the Obama administration progressed, and it has kept them aside since the conclusion of the JCPOA. It is therefore easy for Tehran to resurrect them against the Trump administration. Critical among these levers is meddling in Iraq's internal affairs. Not only is Iraq critical to Iran's regional influence; it is also key to global oil supply. We suspect that a cycle of Iranian retaliation and American Maximum Pressure raises the probability of U.S.-Iran military confrontation to 20%. We will be looking at several key factors in assessing whether the U.S. and Iran are heading towards a confrontation. To that end, we have compiled a U.S.-Iran confrontation checklist (Table 1). Table 1Will The U.S. Attack Iran? Investment Implications Over the past several years, there have been many geopolitical crises in the Middle East. We have tended to fade most of them, from a perspective of a geopolitical risk premium applied to oil prices. This is because we always seek the second derivative of any geopolitical event. In the context of the Middle East, by "second derivative" we mean that we are interested in whether the market impact of a new piece of information - of a new geopolitical event - will amount to more than just a random perturbation with ephemeral, decaying, market implications. To determine the potential of new information to catalyze a persistent market risk premium or discount, we investigate whether it changes the way things change in a given region or context. In 2015, we identified three factors that we believe are critical for a geopolitical event in the Middle East to have such second derivative implications, and thus global market implications.17 These are: Oil supply: The event should impact current global oil supply either directly or through a clear channel of contagion. Renewed sanctions against Iran do so directly. So would Iranian retaliation in Iraq or the Persian Gulf. Geography: The event should occur in a geography that is of existential significance to one of the regional or global players. Re-imposed sanctions obviously directly impact Iran as they could increase domestic political crisis. A potential Iranian proxy-war in Iraq would be highly relevant to Saudi Arabia, which considers Iraq as a vital buffer with Iran. Sectarian contagion: The event should exacerbate sectarian conflict - Sunni vs. Shia - which is more likely to lead contagion than tribal conflict such as the Libyan Civil War. A renewed U.S.-Iran tensions check all of our factors. The risk is therefore real and should be priced by the market through a geopolitical risk premium. In addition, Iranian sanctions could tighten up the outlook for oil markets in 2019 by 400,000-600,000 b/d, reversing most of the production gains that Iran has made since 2016 (Chart 9). This is a problem given that the enormous oversupply of crude oil and oil products held in inventories has already been significantly cut. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy and Energy Sector Strategy teams believe that global petroleum inventories will be further reduced in 2019 (Chart 10). Chart 9Current And Future Iran##br## Production Is At Risk Chart 10Tighter Markets And Lower Inventories,##br## Keep Forward Curves Backwardated What about the hints from the OPEC 2.0 alliance that they would surge production in light of supply loss from Iran? Oil prices fell on the belief OPEC 2.0 could easily restore 1.8 MMb/d of production that they agreed to hold off the market since early 2017. Our commodity strategists have always considered the full number to be an illusion that consists of 1.2 MMb/d of voluntary cuts and around 500,000 b/d of natural production declines that were counted as "cuts" so that the cartel could project an image of greater collaboration than it actually achieved (Chart 11). In fact, some of the lesser "contributors" to the OPEC cut pledged to lower 2017 production by ~400,000 b/d, but are facing 2018 production levels that are projected to be ~700,000 b/d below their 2016 reference levels, and 2019 production levels are estimated to decline by another 200,000 b/d (Chart 12). Chart 11Primary OPEC 2.0 Members Are Producing##br## 1.0 MMb/d Below Pre-Cut Levels Chart 12Secondary OPEC 2.0 "Contributors" ##br##Can't Even Reach Their Quotas Furthermore, renewed Iran-U.S. tensions may only be the second-most investment-relevant geopolitical risk for oil markets. Our commodity team expects Venezuelan production to fall to 1.2 MMb/d by the end of 2018 and to 1 MMb/d by the end of 2019, but these production levels could turn out to be optimistic (Chart 13). BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy therefore projects that the combination of stable global demand, steady declines in Venezuela's crude oil output, and the loss of Iranian exports to U.S. sanctions in 2019 will lift the average Brent and WTI prices to $80 and $72/bbl respectively (Chart 14).18 This forecast, however, represents our baseline based on fundamentals of global oil supply and demand (Chart 15) and does not include our potential scenarios outlined in Diagram 2, which would obviously add additional geopolitical risk premium. Chart 13Venezuela Is A Bigger Risk Chart 14Brent Will Average $80/bbl In 2019 Chart 15Balances Tighter As Supply Falls For investors looking for equity-market exposure in this scenario, BCA's Energy Sector Strategy recommends overweighing U.S. shale producers and shale-focused service companies for investors looking for equity-market exposure to oil prices. Our colleague Matt Conlan, of the BCA Energy Sector Strategy, has broken down this recommendation into specific equity calls, which we encourage our clients to peruse.19 Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Watching Five Risks," dated January 24, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 The JCPOA was concluded in Vienna on July 14, 2015 between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), plus Germany (the "+1" of the P5+1). 3 BCA's Senior Commodity & Energy Strategist Robert P. Ryan has given the name "OPEC 2.0" to the Saudi-Russian alliance that is focused on regaining a modicum of control over the rate at which U.S. shale-oil resources are developed. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "KSA's, Russia's End Game: Contain U.S. Shale Oil," dated March 30, 2017; and "The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One?" dated April 6, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 We use Brent implied volatility - of at-the-money options of the selected futures contract - as an input to construct the cumulative normal density of future prices. Thus, the probability obtained is one where the terminal futures price, at the selected months, exceeds the strike price quoted. In order to derive this probability, we need the current market price of the selected future contract, the number of days to expiration, the strike price, and a measure of the volatility of this contract. 5 "Breakout" nuclear capacity is defined here as having enough uranium enriched at lower levels, such as at 20%, to produce sufficient quantities of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) required for a nuclear device. The often-reported amount of 20% enriched uranium required for breakout capacity is 200kg. However, the actual amount of uranium required depends on the number of centrifuges being employed and their efficiency. In our 2013 report, we gauged that Iran could produce enough HEU within 4-5 weeks at the Fordow facility to develop a weapon, which means that it had effectively reached "breakout capacity." 6 Please see International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation Of The NPT Safeguards Agreement And Relevant Provisions Of Security Council Resolutions In The Islamic Republic Of Iran," IAEA Board Report, dated August 28, 2013, available at www.iaea.org. 7 Although, in a move designed to increase pressure on Iran and its main trade partners, the Obama administration sold Israel the GBU-28 bunker-busting ordinance. That specific ordinance is very powerful, but still not capable enough to penetrate Fordow. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Middle East: Paradigm Shift," dated November 13, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Special Report, "Crisis In The Persian Gulf: Investment Implications," dated March 1, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 There are four U.S. Navy Avenger-class minesweepers based in Bahrain as part of the joint U.S.-U.K. TF-52. This number has been the same since 2012, when they were deployed to the region. 11 Particularly crippling for Iran's economy was the EU oil embargo imposed in January 2012, effective from July of that year, and the banning of Iranian financial institutions from participating in the SWIFT system in March 2012. 12 The Guardian Council of the Constitution is a 12-member, unelected body wielding considerable power in Iran. It has consistently disqualified reformist candidates from running in elections, which makes its approval of Rouhani's candidacy all the more significant. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Reality Check: Israel Will Not Bomb Iran (Ever)," dated August 14, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 The NATO war with Yugoslavia in 1999 reveals how challenging SEAD missions can be if the adversary refuses to engage its air defense systems. The U.S. and its NATO allies bombed Serbia and its forces for nearly three months with limited effectiveness against the country's surface-to-air capabilities. The Serbian military simply refused to turn on its radar installations, making U.S. AGM-88 HARM air-to-surface anti-radiation missiles, designed to home in on electronic transmissions coming from radar systems, ineffective. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Trump Re-Establishes America's 'Credible Threats,'" dated April 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World," dated September 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Middle East: A Tale Of Red Herrings And Black Swans," dated October 14, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Brent, WTI Average $80, $72 Next Year; Upside Risk Dominates, $100/bbl Possible In 2019," dated May 24, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 19 Please see BCA Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Geopolitical Certainty: OPEC Production Risks Are Playing To Shale Producers' Advantage," dated May 9, 2018, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) (Continued) Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) (Continued)